Aleph: Efficient Atomic Broadcast in Asynchronous Networks with
  Byzantine Nodes by Gągol, Adam et al.
Aleph: Eicient Atomic Broadcast in Asynchronous Networks
with Byzantine Nodes
Adam Gągol1,2, Damian Leśniak1,2, Damian Straszak1, Michał Świętek1,2
1 Aleph Zero Foundation
2 Jagiellonian University
ABSTRACT
The spectacular success of Bitcoin and Blockchain Technology in
recent years has provided enough evidence that a widespread adop-
tion of a common cryptocurrency system is not merely a distant
vision, but a scenario that might come true in the near future. How-
ever, the presence of Bitcoin’s obvious shortcomings such as exces-
sive electricity consumption, unsatisfying transaction throughput,
and large validation time (latency) makes it clear that a new, more
ecient system is needed.
We propose a protocol in which a set of nodes maintains and up-
dates a linear ordering of transactions that are being submitted by
users. Virtually every cryptocurrency system has such a protocol
at its core, and it is the eciency of this protocol that determines
the overall throughput and latency of the system. We develop our
protocol on the grounds of the well-established eld of Asynchro-
nous Byzantine Fault Tolerant (ABFT) systems. This allows us to
formally reason about correctness, eciency, and security in the
strictest possible model, and thus convincingly prove the overall
robustness of our solution.
Our protocol improves upon the state-of-the-art HoneyBad-
gerBFT by Miller et al. by reducing the asymptotic latency while
matching the optimal communication complexity. Furthermore, in
contrast to the above, our protocol does not require a trusted dealer
thanks to a novel implementation of a trustless ABFT Randomness
Beacon.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction of Bitcoin and the Blockchain in the seminal
paper of Satoshi Nakamoto [39] is already considered a pivotal
point in the history of Finanancial Technologies. While the rise of
Bitcoin’s popularity clearly shows that there is signicant interest
in a globally distributed currency system, the scalability issues have
become a signicant hurdle to achieve it. Indeed, Bitcoin’s latency
of 30 to 60 minutes, the throughput of 7 transactions per second,
and the excessive power usage of the proof of work consensus
protocol have motivated the search for alternatives.
At the core of virtually every cryptocurrency system lies a mech-
anism that collects transactions from users and constructs a to-
tal ordering of them, i.e., either explicitly or implicitly forming
a blockchain of transactions. This total ordering is then used to
determine which transaction came rst in case of double-spending
attempts and thus to decide which transactions should be vali-
dated. The protocol that guides the maintenance and growth of
this total ordering is the heart of the whole system. In Bitcoin,
the protocol is Proof of Work, but there are also systems based
on Proof of Stake [12, 30] and modications of these two basic
paradigms [32, 44]. Aside from eciency, the primary concern
when designing such protocols is their security. While Bitcoin’s
security certainly has passed the test of time, numerous newly pro-
posed designs claim security but fall short of providing convincing
arguments. In many such cases, serious vulnerabilities have been
discovered, see [2, 18].
Given these examples, one may agree that for a new system to
be trusted, strong mathematical foundations should guarantee its
security. What becomes important then are the assumptions under
which the security claim is pursued – in order to best imitate the
highly adversarial execution environment of a typical permission-
less blockchain system, one should work in the strictest possible
model. Such a model – the Asynchronous Network model with
Byzantine Faults – has spawned a large volume of research within
the eld of Distributed Systems for the past four decades. Protocols
that are designed to work in this model are called Asynchronous
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (ABFT) – and are resistant to harsh net-
work conditions: arbitrarily long delays on messages, node crashes,
or even multiple nodes colluding in order to break the system. In-
terestingly, even though these protocols seem to perfectly meet
the robustness requirements for these kinds of applications, they
have still not gained much recognition in the crypto-community.
This is perhaps because the ABFT model is often considered purely
theoretical, and in fact, the literature might be hard to penetrate by
an inexperienced reader due to heavy mathematical formalism. In-
deed, several of the most important results in this area [9, 10, 19, 24]
have been developed in the ’80s and ’90s and were likely not meant
for deployment at that time but rather to obtain best asymptotic
guarantees. Now, 30 years in the future, perhaps surprisingly, the
ABFT model has become more practically relevant than ever, since
the presence of bad actors in modern distributed ledger systems
is inevitable, and their power ranges from blocking or taking over
several nodes to even entirely shutting down large parts of the
network.
In recent important work [35], Miller et al. presented the Honey-
BadgerBFT (HBBFT) protocol, taking the rst step towards practical
ABFT systems. HBBFT achieves optimal, constant communication
overhead, and its validation time scales logarithmically with the
number of nodes. Moreover, importantly, HBBFT is rather simple to
understand, and its eciency has been also conrmed by running
large-scale experiments. Still, an unpleasant drawback of HBBFT,
especially in the context of trustless applications, is that it requires
a trusted dealer to initialize.
In this paper, we present a completely new ABFT protocol that
keeps all of the good properties of HBBFT and improves upon it
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in two important aspects: tightening the complexity bounds on
latency from logarithmic to constant and eliminating the need for
a trusted dealer. Furthermore even though being developed for
the asynchronous setting, it matches the optimistic-case perfor-
mance of 3-round validation time of state-of-the-art synchronous
protocols [21]. We believe that our protocol is simple to under-
stand, due to its transparent structure that clearly separates the
network layer from the protocol logic. We also present a contribu-
tion that might be of independent interest: an ecient, completely
trustless ABFT Randomness Beacon that generates common, un-
predictable randomness. Since such a mechanism is necessary in
many blockchain-based systems, we believe it might see future
applications. Finally, we believe that this paper, while oering a
valuable theoretical improvement, also contributes to bridging the
gap between the theory and practice of ABFT systems.
2 OUR RESULTS
The main goal of this paper1 is to design a distributed system
that runs in a trustless network environment and whose purpose
is to build a collective total ordering of messages submitted by
users. Apart from blockchain, such systems have several other
applications, for example implementing state machine replication,
where messages can be arbitrary operations to be executed by
a state machine, and the purpose of the system is to keep the
states of several copies of the machine consistent by executing the
commands in the same order.
A major decision to make when designing systems of this kind
is how to realistically model a network environment where such a
system would run. In the subsequent paragraphs, we introduce the
model we work in and argue why we nd it the most suitable for
applications in distributed nancial systems.
Nodes and Messages. The system consists of N parties P =
{P1,P2, . . . ,PN } that are called nodes. Each node Pi identies
itself through its public key pki for which it holds a private key ski
that allows it to sign messages if necessary. Messages in the system
are point-to-point, i.e., a node Pi can send a messagem to another
node Pj ; the node Pj is then convinced that the message came from
Pi because of the signature. We assume signatures are unforgeable,
so a node also cannot deny sending a particular message, since it
was signed with its private key.
NetworkModel. The crucial part of the model are the assumptions
about the message delivery and delays. These assumptions are
typically formulated by dening the abilities of an adversary, i.e., a
powerful entity that watches the system and performs actions to
slow it down or cause its malfunction. The rst assumption that is
somewhat necessary is that the adversary cannot destroy messages
that were sent, i.e., when a node sends a message, then it eventually
reaches the recipient. In practice, this assumption can be enforced
by sending the same message multiple times if necessary. Note also
that an adversary with the ability to destroy messages would easily
block every possible system, by just destroying all messages. Given
that, the most powerful ability an adversary could possibly have is
1In order to make this text accessible also for readers with no background in Secure
Distributed Systems, the narration of the paper focuses on providing intuitions and
explaining the core ideas, at the cost of occasionally being slightly informal. At the
same time, we stay mathematically rigorous when it comes to theorems and proofs.
to delay messages for an arbitrary amount of time. This is what we
assume and what is known in the literature as the Asynchronous
Network Model. That means the adversary can watch messages
being sent and schedule their delivery in an arbitrary order.
In contrast, another popular model is the Synchronous Network
Model2, where a global-bound ∆ exists such that whenever a mes-
sage is sent, it is delivered after time at most ∆. As one can imagine,
this assumption certainly makes protocol design easier; however,
the crucial question to address is: which of these models – asynchro-
nous or synchronous – better ts the typical execution environment
of a cryptocurrency system, i.e., the Internet.
While the asynchronous model may seem overly conservative,
since no real-life adversary has full control over the network delays,
there are mechanisms that may grant him partial control, such as
timed DoS attacks. Additionally, synchrony assumptions may be
violated due to factors such as transient network partitions or a
massive CPU load on several nodes preventing them from sending
messages timely.
Finally, the key quality of any protocol meant for nance-related
applications is its overall robustness, i.e., a very general notion of
resilience against changing network conditions and against other
unforeseeable factors. The archetypical partially synchronous algo-
rithm PBFT [21] (and its numerous variants [1, 11, 31]) works in
two modes: optimistic and pessimistic. The often-claimed simplic-
ity of PBFT indeed manifests itself in the optimistic mode, but the
pessimistic mode (that could as well become the default one under
unfavorable network conditions) is in fact a completely separate
algorithm that is objectively complex and thus prone to implemen-
tation errors. Notably, Miller et al. in [35] demonstrate an attack
scenario on protocols from the PBFT family that completely blocks
their operation. In the same paper [35], it is also reasoned that
asynchronous protocols are substantially more robust, as the model
somewhat forces a single, homogeneous operation mode of the
algorithm. As such, we believe that the asynchronous model, even
though it enforces stricter conditions, is the best way to describe
the environment in which our system is going to operate.
Node Faults. For the kind of system we are trying to design, one
cannot assume that all the nodes always proceed according to the
protocol. A node could simply crash, or go oine, and thus stop
sending messages. Alternatively, a node or a set of nodes could
act maliciously (be controlled by the adversary) and send arbitrary
messages in order to confuse the remaining nodes and simply break
the protocol. These latter kinds of nodes are typically referred to in
the literature as dishonest, malicious, faulty, or Byzantine nodes, and
a protocol that solves a given problem in the presence of dishonest
nodes is called Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT). In cryptocurrency
systems the presence of dishonest nodes is more than guaranteed as
there will always be parties trying to take advantage of design aws
in order to gain nancial benets. It is known that no asynchronous
system can function properly (reach consensus) in the presence
of N/3 or more dishonest nodes [10]; thus, we make the standard
assumption that the total number of nodes is N = 3f + 1, and f of
them are dishonest.
2The Synchronous Model comes in several variants depending on whether the global
bound ∆ is known to the algorithm or not and whether there is an initial, nite period
of asynchrony.
2
2.1 Our Contribution
Before presenting our contributions, let us formalize the problem
of building a total ordering of transactions, which in the literature
is known under the name of Atomic Broadcast.
Definition 2.1 (Atomic Broadcast). Atomic Broadcast is a
problem in which a set of nodes commonly constructs a total ordering
of a set of transactions, where the transactions arrive at nodes in an
on-line fashion, i.e., might not be given all at once. In a protocol that is
meant to solve Atomic Broadcast, the following primitives are dened
for every node:
(1) Input(tx) is called whenever a new transaction tx is received
by the node,
(2) Output(pos, tx) is called when the node decides to place the
transaction tx at the position pos ∈ N.
We say that such a protocol implements Atomic Broadcast if it meets
all the requirements listed below:
(1) Total Order. Every node outputs a sequence of transac-
tions in an incremental manner, i.e., before outputting a
transaction at position pos ∈ N it must have before output
transactions at all positions < pos , and only one transaction
can be output at a given position.
(2) Agreement. Whenever an honest node outputs a transac-
tion tx at position pos , every other honest node eventually
outputs the same transaction at this position.
(3) Censorship Resilience. Every transaction tx that is input
at some honest node is eventually output by all honest nodes.
The above denition formally describes the setting in which all
nodes listen for transactions and commonly construct an ordering
of them. While the Total Order and Agreement properties ensure
that all the honest nodes always produce the same ordering, the
Censorship Resilience property is to guarantee that no transaction
is lost due to censorship (especially important in nancial applica-
tions) but also guarantees that the system makes progress and does
not become stuck as long as new transactions are being received.
Let us briey discuss how the performance of such an Atomic
Broadcast protocol is measured. The notion of time is not so
straightforward when talking about asynchronous protocols, as
the adversary has the power to arbitrarily delay messages between
nodes. For this reason, the running time of such a protocol is usually
measured in the number of asynchronous rounds it takes to achieve
a specic goal [19]. Roughly speaking, the protocol advances to
round number r whenever all messages sent in round r − 2 have
been delivered; for a detailed description of asynchronous rounds,
we refer the reader to Section G.
The second performance measure that is typically used when
evaluating such protocols is communication complexity, i.e., how
much data is being sent between the nodes (on average, by a single
honest node). To reduce the number of parameters required to state
this result, we assume that a transaction, a digital signature, an
index of a node, etc., all incur a constant communication overhead
when sent; in other words, the communication complexity is mea-
sured in machine words, which are assumed to t all the above
objects. Our rst contribution is the Aleph protocol for solving
Atomic Brodcast whose properties are described in the following
Theorem 2.1 (Atomic Broadcast). The Aleph protocol imple-
ments Atomic Broadcast over N = 3f + 1 nodes in asynchronous
network, of which f are dishonest and has the following properties:
(1) Latency. For every transaction tx that is input to at least k
honest nodes, the expected number of asynchronous rounds
until it is output by every honest node is O(N/k).
(2) Communication Complexity. The total communication
complexity of the protocol in R rounds3 isO(T +R ·N 2 logN )
per node, where T is the total number of transactions input
to honest nodes during R rounds.
We believe that the most important parameter of such a protocol
and also the one that is hardest to optimize in practice4 is the
transaction latency. This is why we mainly focus on achieving the
optimal O(1) latency5. In the Honey Badger BFT [35] the latency is
Ω(logN ) in the optimistic case, while it becomes Ω(β logN ) when
there are roughly βN 2 logN unordered transactions in the system
at the time when tx is input. In contrast, the latency of our protocol
is O(1) independently from the load.
Similarly to [35] we need to make somewhat troublesome as-
sumptions about the rate at which transactions arrive in the system
to reason about the communication complexity, see Section 2.2
for comparison. Still, in the regime of [35] where a steady inow
of transactions is being assumed (i.e., roughly N 2 per round), we
match the optimal O(1) communication complexity per transaction
of Honey Badger BFT [35]. As a practical note, we also mention that
a variant of our protocol (Section A) achieves the optimal 3-round
validation latency in the “optimistic case" akin to partially synchro-
nous protocols from the PBFT family [11, 21] (see Section C.3 for a
proof). On top of that, our protocol satises the so-called Responsive-
ness property [40] which intuitively means that it makes progress
at speed proportional to the instantaneous network throughput
and is not slowed down by predened timeouts.
Importantly, we believe that aside from achieving optimal latency
and communication complexity, Aleph is simple, clean, and easy to
understand, which makes it well t for a practical implementation.
This is a consequence of its modular structure, which separates
entirely the network communication layer from the protocol logic.
More specically, the only role of the network layer is to maintain
a common (among nodes) data structure called a Communication
History DAG, and the protocol logic is then stated entirely through
combinatorial properties of this structure. We introduce our proto-
col in Section 3 and formally prove its properties in Sections C, D
and E.
Another important property of our protocol is that unlike [16, 35],
it does not require a trusted dealer. The role of a trusted dealer
is typically to distribute certain cryptographic keys among nodes
before the protocol starts. Clearly, in blockchain systems, no trusted
entities can be assumed to exist, and thus a trusted setup is tricky
if not impossible to achieve in real-world applications.
Our second contribution is an important, stand-alone component
of our protocol that allows us to remove the trusted dealer assump-
tion. More specically, it can be seen as a protocol for generating
3Here by a round we formally mean a DAG-rounds, as formally dened in Section 3.1.
4The bandwidth is potentially unbounded and can be improved in various ways, while
the speed of light puts a hard limit on the network delay.
5The O (1) latency is achieved for transactions that are input to at least k = Ω(N )
honest nodes. This is the same regime as in [35] where it is assumed that k > 2/3N .
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unpredictable, common randomness, or in other words, it imple-
ments an ABFT Randomness Beacon. Such a source of randomness
is indispensable in any ABFT protocol for Atomic Broadcast, since
by the FLP-impossibility result [24], it is not possible to reach con-
sensus in this model using a deterministic protocol. Below we
give a formalization of what it means for a protocol to implement
such a randomness source. The number λ that appears below is
the so-called security parameter (i.e., the length of a hash, digital
signature, etc.).
Definition 2.2 (Randomness Beacon). We say that a pair of
protocols (Setup, Toss(m)) implements a Randomness Beacon if after
running Setup once, each execution of Toss(m) (for any noncem ∈
{0, 1}?) results in λ fresh random bits. More formally, we require
• Termination. All honest nodes correctly terminate after
running either Setup or Toss(m),
• Correctness. For a nonce m ∈ {0, 1}?, Toss(m) results
in all honest nodes outputting a common bitstring σm ∈
{0, 1}λ ,
• Unpredictability. No computationally bounded adversary
can predict the outcome of Toss(m) with non-negligible prob-
ability.
In the literature such a source of randomness (especially the variant
that outputs just a single bit) is often called a Common Coin [15, 16,
35] or a Global Coin [19]. We note that once the Toss(m) protocol
terminates, the value of σm is known, and after revealing it, an-
other execution of Toss(m) will not provide new random bits; thus,
the Unpredictability property is meant to be satised only before
Toss(m) is initiated. As our second main contribution, in Section 4
we introduce the ABFT-Beacon protocol, and in Section E we prove
the following
Theorem 2.2 (ABFT-Beacon). The ABFT-Beacon protocol imple-
ments a Randomness Beacon (Setup, Toss(m)) such that:
• the Setup phase takesO(1) asynchronous rounds to complete
and has O(N 2 logN ) communication complexity per node,
• each subsequent call to Toss(m) takes 1 asynchronous round
and has O(N ) communication complexity per node.
We also remark that the ABFT-Beacon is relatively light when it
comes to computational complexity, as the setup requires roughly
O(N 3) time per node, and each subsequent toss takes typicallyO(N )
time (under a slightly relaxed adversarial setting); see Section 4.
As an addition to our positive results, in Section H we introduce
the Fork Bomb – a spam attack scenario that aects most known
DAG-based protocols. In this attack, malicious nodes force honest
nodes to download exponential amounts of data and thus likely
crash their machines. This attack when attempted to prevent at
the implementation layer by banning “suspect nodes” is likely to
harm honest nodes as well. Thus, we strongly believe that without
a mechanism preventing this kind of attacks already at the protocol
layer, liveness is not guaranteed. The basic version of Aleph is
resistant against this attack through the use of reliable broadcast to
disseminate information among nodes. In Section A we also show a
mechanism to defend against this attack for a gossip-based variant
of Aleph.
2.2 Related Work
Atomic Broadcast. For an excellent introduction to the eld of
Distributed Computing and overview of Atomic Broadcast and
Consensus protocols we refer the reader to the book [13]. A more
recent work of [18] surveys existing consensus protocols in the
context of cryptocurrency systems.
The line of work on synchronous BFT protocols was initiated
in [21] with the introduction of PBFT. PBFT and its numerous
variants [1, 11, 31] tolerate byzantine faults, yet their eciency
relies on the good behavior of the network, and drops signicantly
when entering the (in some cases implicit) “pessimistic mode”. As
thoroughly reasoned in [35], synchronous algorithms might not
be well suited for blockchain-related applications, because of their
lack of robustness and vulnerability to certain types of attacks.
In the realm of asynchronous BFT protocols, a large part of
the literature focuses on the more classical Consensus problem,
i.e., reaching binary agreement by all the honest nodes. As one
can imagine, ordering transactions can be reduced to a sequence
of binary decisions, and indeed there are known generic reduc-
tions that solve Atomic Broadcast by running Consensus multiple
times [5, 15, 22, 36]. However, all these reductions either increase
the number of rounds by a super-constant factor or introduce a sig-
nicant communication overhead. Thus, even though Consensus
protocols with optimal number of O(1) rounds [19] and optimal
communication complexity [16, 38] were known early on, only in
the recent work of [35] the Honey Badger BFT (HBBFT) protocol
with optimal O(1) communication complexity per transaction was
proposed.
The comparison of our protocol to HBBFT is not straightforward
since the models of transaction arrivals dier. Roughly, HBBFT
assumes that at every round, every node has Ω(N 2) transactions in
its buer. Under this assumption the communication complexity
of HBBFT per epoch, per node is roughly O(N 2), and also Ω(N 2)
transactions are ordered in one epoch, hence the optimal O(1) per
transaction is achieved. However, the design of HBBFT that is
optimized towards low communication complexity has the nega-
tive eect that the latency might be large under high load. More
precisely, if βN 2 transactions are pending in the system6 when tx
is being input, the latency of tx is ≈ β epochs, thus ≈ β log(N )
rounds. Our algorithm, when adjusted to this model would achieve
≈ β rounds of latency (thus log(N )-factor improvement), while
retaining the same, optimal communication complexity.
In this paper we propose a dierent assumption on the transac-
tion buers that allows us to better demonstrate the capabilities of
our protocol when it comes to latency. We assume that at every
round the ratio between lengths of transaction buers of any two
honest nodes is at most a xed constant. In this model, our protocol
achieves O(1) latency, while a natural adaptation of HBBFT would
achieve latencyO(log(N )), thus again a factor-log(N ) improvement.
A qualitative improvement over HBBFT that we achieve in this pa-
per is that we completely get rid of the trusted dealer assumption.
We also note that the denitions of Atomic Broadcast slightly dier
between this paper and [35]: we achieve Censorship Resilience
6For the sake of this comparison we only consider transactions that have been input
to Ω(N ) honest nodes.
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assuming that it was input to even a single honest node, while
in [35] it has to be input to Ω(N ) nodes.
The recent work7 of Abraham et al. [3] studies a closely related
Validated Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (VABA) problem,
which is, roughly speaking, the problem of picking one value out of
N proposed by the nodes. The protocol in [3] achievesO(1) latency
and has optimal communication complexity of O(N ) per node. We
believe that combining it with the ideas present in HoneyBadgerBFT
can yield an algorithm with the same communication complexity
as HoneyBadgerBFT but with latency improved by a factor of logN .
However, when compared to ours, such a protocol still requires a
trusted dealer and achieves weaker censorship resilience.
Finally, we remark that our algorithm is based on maintaining a
DAG data structure representing the communication history of the
protocol. This can be seen as a realization of Lamport’s “happened-
before” relation [33] or the so-called Causal Order [27]. To the
best of our knowledge, the rst instance of using DAGs to design
asynchronous protocols is the work of [37]. More recently DAGs
gained more attention in the blockchain space [4, 23, 44].
Common Randomness. For a thorough overview of previous
work on generating randomness in distributed systems and a dis-
cussion on the novelty of our solution we refer to Section 4.1.
3 ATOMIC BROADCAST
This section is devoted to an outline and discussion of the Aleph
protocol. We start by sketching the overall idea of the algorithm
and explaining how it works from a high-level perspective. In this
process we present the most basic variant of the Aleph protocol,
which already contains all the crucial ideas and gives a provably
correct implementation of Atomic Broadcast. On the theoretical
side, however, this basic variant might suer from a slightly sub-
optimal communication complexity. In Section D we describe a
simple tweak to the protocol which allows us to nally achieve the
communication complexity as claimed in Theorem 2.1. We refer to
Sections C and D for proofs of correctness and eciency of Aleph.
3.1 Asynchronous communication as a DAG
The concept of a “communication round” as explained in the pre-
liminaries, is rather natural in the synchronous model, but might
be hard to grasp when talking about asynchronous settings. This
is one of the reasons why asynchronous models are, generally
speaking, harder to work with than their (partially) synchronous
counterparts, especially when it comes to proving properties of
such protocols.
Units and DAGs. To overcome the above issue, we present a gen-
eral framework for constructing and analyzing asynchronous pro-
tocols that is based on maintaining (by all the nodes) the common
“communication history” in the form of an append-only structure:
a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph).
The DAGs that we consider in this paper originate from the fol-
lowing idea: we would like to divide the execution of the algorithm
into virtual rounds so that in every round r every node emits exactly
one Unit that should be thought of as a message broadcast to all the
other nodes. Moreover, every such unit should have “pointers” to a
7We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this work to our
attention.
large enough number of units from the previous round, emitted by
other nodes. Such pointers can be realized by including hashes of
the corresponding units, which, assuming that our hash function
is collision-free, allows to uniquely determine the “parent units”.
Formally, every unit has the following elds:
• Creator. Index and a signature of unit’s creator.
• Parents. A list of units’ hashes.
• Data. Additional data to be included in the unit.
The fact that a unit U has another unit V included as its parent
signies that the information piece carried by V was known to U ’s
creator at the time of constructing U , i.e., V causally preceeds U .
All the nodes are expected to generate such units in accordance
to some initially agreed upon rules (dened by the protocol) and
maintain their local copies of the common DAG, to which new units
are continuously being added.
Communication History DAGs. To dene the basic rules of
creating units note rst that this DAG structure induces a partial
ordering on the set of units. To emphasize this fact, we often write
V 6 U if either V is a parent of U , or more generally (transitive
closure) thatV can be reached fromU by taking the “parent pointer”
several times. This also gives rise to the notion of DAG-round of a
unit U that is dened to be the maximum length of a downward
chain starting at U . In other words, recursively, a unit with no
parents has DAG-round 0 and otherwise a unit has DAG-round
equal to the maximum of DAG-rounds of its parents plus one. We
denote the DAG-round of a unit U by R(U ). Usually we just write
“round” instead ofDAG-round except for parts where the distinction
between DAG-round and async-round (as dened in Section G) is
relevant (i.e., mostly Section D). We now proceed to dene the
notion of a ch-DAG (communication history DAG) that serves as a
backbone of the Aleph protocol.
Definition 3.1 (ch-DAG). We say that a set of units D created
by N = 3f + 1 nodes forms a ch-DAG if the parents of every unit in
D also belong to D and additionally the following conditions hold
true
(1) Chains. For each honest node Pi ∈ P, the set of units in D
created by Pi forms a chain.
(2) Dissemination. Every round-r unit inD has at least 2f +1
parents of round r − 1.
(3) Diversity Every unit in D has parents created by pairwise
distinct nodes.
What the above denition tries to achieve is that, roughly, every
node should create one unit in every round and it should do so after
learning a large enough portion (i.e. at least 2f + 1) of units created
in the previous round. The purpose of the Chains rule is to forbid
forking, i.e., a situation where a node creates more than one unit in
a single round. The second rule, Dissemination, guarantees that
a node creating a unit in round r learned as much as possible from
the previous round – note that as there are only N − f = 2f + 1
honest nodes in the system, we cannot require that a node receives
more than 2f + 1 units, as byzantine nodes might not have created
them. The unit may have additional parents, but the Diversity rule
ensures that they are created by dierent nodes - otherwise units
could become progressively bigger as the ch-DAG grows, by linking
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to all the units in existence, hence increasing the communication
complexity of the protocol.
Building DAGs. The pseudocode DAG − Grow(D) provides a
basic implementation of a node that takes part in maintaining a
common DAG. Such a node initializes rstD to an empty DAG and
then runs two procedures CreateUnit and ReceiveUnits in parallel.
To create a unit at round r , we simply wait until 2f + 1 units of
round r − 1 are available and then, for every node, we pick its unit
of highest round (i.e., of round at most r − 1) and include all these
N (unless some nodes created no units at all, in which case < N )
units as parents of the unit. In other words, we wait just enough
until we can advance to the next round, and attach to our round-r
unit everything we knew at that point in time.
DAG-Grow(D):
1 CreateUnit(data):
2 for r = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
3 if r>0 then
4 wait until |{U ∈ D : R(U ) = r − 1}| > 2f + 1
5 P ← {maximal Pi ’s unit of round < r in D : Pi ∈ P}
6 create a new unit U with P as parents
7 include data in U
8 addU to D
9 RBC(U )
10 ReceiveUnits:
11 loop forever
12 upon receiving a unitU via RBC do
13 addU to D
BothCreateUnit and ReceiveUnitsmake use of a primitive called
RBC that stands for Reliable Broadcast. This is an asynchronous
protocol that guarantees that every unit broadcast by an honest
node is eventually received by all honest nodes. More specically
we use the validated RBC protocol which also ensures that incorrect
units (with incorrect signatures or incorrect number of parents, etc.)
are never broadcast successfully. Furthermore, our version of RBC
forces every node to broadcast exactly one unit per round, thus
eectively banning forks. We refer to Section F for a thorough
discussion on Reliable Broadcast.
The validated RBC algorithm internally checks whether a cer-
tain Valid(U ) predicate is satised when receiving a unit U . This
predicate makes sure that the requirements in Denition 3.1 are sat-
ised, as well as veries that certain data, required by the protocol
is included in U . Consequently, only valid units are added to the
local ch-DAGs maintained by nodes. Furthermore, as alluded above,
there can be only a single copy of a unit created by a particular
node in a particular round. This guarantees that the local copies of
ch-DAGs maintained by dierent nodes always stay consistent.
Let us now describe more formally the desired properties of a
protocol used to grow and maintain a common ch-DAG. For this
it is useful to introduce the following convention: we denote the
local copy of the ch-DAG maintaned by the ith node by Di .
Definition 3.2. We distinguish the following properties of a pro-
tocol for constructing a common ch-DAG
(1) Reliable: for every unit U added to a local copy Di of an
honest node Pi ,U is eventually added to the local copy Dj
of every honest node Pj .
(2) Ever-expanding: for every honest node Pi the local copy
Di grows indenitely, i.e., R(Di ) := max{r (U ) | U ∈ Di }
is unbounded.
(3) Fork-free: whenever two honest nodes i1, i2 hold unitsU1 ∈
Di1 and U2 ∈ Di2 such that both U1, U2 have the same
creator and the same round number, thenU1 = U2.
Having these properties dened, we are ready to state the main
theorem describing the process of constructing ch-DAG by the
DAG-Grow protocol.
Theorem 3.1. TheDAG-Grow protocol is reliable, ever-expanding,
and fork-free Additionally, during asynchronous round r each honest
node holds a local copy of D of round at least Ω(r ).
For a proof we refer the reader to Section B.1.
Benets of Using DAGs. After formally introducing the idea of a
ch-DAG and explaining how it is constructed we are nally ready
to discuss the signicance of this concept. First of all, ch-DAGs
allow for a clean and conceptually simple separation between the
communication layer (sending and receiving messages between
nodes) and the protocol logic (mainly deciding on relative order
of transactions). Specically, the network layer is simply realized
by running Reliable Broadcast in the background, and the protocol
logic is implemented as running o-line computations on the local
copy of the ch-DAG. One can think of the local copy of the ch-DAG
as the state of the corresponding node; all decisions of a node
are based solely on its state. One important consequence of this
separation is that the network layer, being independent from the
logic, can be as well implemented dierently, for instance using
ordinary broadcast or random gossip (see Section A).
In the protocol based on ch-DAGs the concept of an adversary
and his capabilities are arguably easier to understand. The abil-
ity of the adversary to delay a message now translates into a unit
being added to some node’s local copy of the ch-DAG with a de-
lay. Nonetheless, every unit that has ever been created will still be
eventually added to all the ch-DAGs maintained by honest nodes.
A consequence of the above is that the adversary can (almost arbi-
trarily) manipulate the structure of the ch-DAG, or, in other words,
he is able to force a given set of round-(r − 1) parents for a given
round-r unit. But even then, it needs to pick at least 2f + 1 round-
(r − 1) units, which enforces that more than a half of every unit’s
parents are created by honest nodes.
3.2 Atomic broadcast via ch-DAG
In this section we show how to build an Atomic Broadcast protocol
based on the ch-DAG maintained locally by all the nodes. Recall that
nodes receive transactions in an on-line fashion and their goal is to
construct a common linear ordering of these transactions. Every
node thus gathers transactions in its local buer and whenever
it creates a new unit, all transactions from its buer are included
in the data eld of the new unit and removed from the buer.8
8This is the simplest possible strategy for including transactions in the ch-DAG and
while it is provably correct it may not be optimal in terms of communication complexity.
We show how to x this in Section D.
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Thus, to construct a common linear ordering on transactions it
suces to construct a linear ordering of units in the ch-DAG (the
transactions within units can be ordered in an arbitrary yet xed
manner, for instance alphabetically). The ordering that we are
going to construct also has the nice property that it extends the
ordering of units induced by the ch-DAG (i.e. the causal order).
Let us remark at this point that all primitives that we describe
in this section take a local copy D of the ch-DAG as one of their
parameters and return either
• a result (which might be a single bit, a unit, etc.), or
• ⊥, signifying that the result is not yet available in D.
The latter means that in order to read o the result, the local copy
D needs to grow further. We occasionally omit the D argument,
when it is clear from the context which local copy should be used.
Ordering Units. The main primitive that is used to order units in
the ch-DAG, OrderUnits, takes a local copy D of the ch-DAG and
outputs a list linord that contains a subset of units in D. This list
is a prex of the global linear ordering that is commonly generated
by all the nodes. We note that linord will normally not contain
all the units in D but a certain subset of them. More precisely,
linord contains all units in D except those created in the most
recent (typically around 3) rounds. While these top units cannot be
ordered yet, the structural information about the ch-DAG they carry
is used to order the units below them. Intuitively, the algorithm
that is run in the ch-DAG at round r makes decisions regarding
units that are several rounds deeper, thus the delay.
Note that dierent nodes might hold dierent versions of the
ch-DAG at any specic point in time, but what we guarantee in the
ch-DAG growing protocol is that all copies of ch-DAG are consis-
tent, i.e., all the honest nodes always see exactly the same version of
every unit ever created, and that every unit is eventually received
by all honest nodes. The function OrderUnits is designed in such a
way that even when called on dierent versions of the ch-DAGD1,
D2, as long as they are consistent, the respective outputs linorder1,
linorder2 also agree, i.e., one of them is a prex of the other.
The OrderUnits primitive is rather straightforward. At every
round r , one unit Vr from among units of round r is chosen to
be a “head” of this round, as implemented in ChooseHead. Next,
all the units in D that are less than Vr , but are not less than any
of V0,V1, . . . ,Vr−1 form the r th batch of units. The batches are
sorted by their round numbers and units within batches are sorted
topologically breaking ties using the units’ hashes.
Choosing Heads. Perhaps surprisingly, the only nontrivial part
of the protocol is choosing a head unit for each round. It is not
hard to see that simple strategies for choosing a head fail in an
asynchronous network. For instance, one could try picking always
the unit created by the rst node to be the head: this does not work
because the rst node might be byzantine and never create any unit.
To get around this issue, one could try another tempting strategy:
to choose a head for round r , every node waits till round r + 10, and
declares as the head the unit of round r in its copy of the ch-DAG
that has the smallest hash. This strategy is also doomed to fail, as
it might cause inconsistent choices of heads between nodes: this
can happen when some of the nodes see a unit with a very small
hash in their ch-DAG while the remaining ones did not receive it
yet, which might have either happened just by accident or was
Aleph:
1 OrderUnits(D):
2 linord← []
3 for r = 0, 1, . . . ,R(D) do
4 Vr ← ChooseHead(r ,D)
5 if Vr = ⊥ then break
6 batch← {U ∈ D : U 6 Vr andU < linord}
7 order batch deterministically
8 append batch to linord
9 output linord
10 ChooseHead(r ,D):
11 pir ← GeneratePermutation(r ,D)
12 if pir = ⊥ then output ⊥
13 else
14 (U1,U2, . . . ,Uk ) ← pir
15 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,k do
16 if Decide(Ui ,D) = 1 then
17 outputUi
18 else if Decide(Ui ,D) = ⊥ then
19 output ⊥
20 output ⊥
forced by actions of the adversary. Note that under asynchrony,
one can never be sure whether missing a unit from some rounds
back means that there is a huge delay in receiving it or it was never
created (the creator is byzantine). More generally, this also justies
that in any asynchronous BFT protocol it is never correct to wait
for one xed node to send a particular message.
Our strategy for choosing a head in round r is quite simple: pick
the rst unit (i.e., with lowest creator id) that is visible by every node.
The obvious gap in the above is how do we decide that a particular
unit is visible? As observed in the example above, waiting a xed
number of rounds is not sucient, as seeing a unit locally does not
imply that all other nodes see it as well. Instead, we need to solve
an instance of Binary Consensus (also called Binary Agreement). In
the pseudocode this is represented by a Decide(U ) function that
outputs 0 or 1; we discuss it in the subsequent paragraph.
There is another minor adjustment to the above scheme that
aims at decreasing the worst case latency, which in the just intro-
duced version is O(logN ) rounds9. When using a random permu-
tation (unpredictable by the adversary) instead of the order given
by the units creator indices, the latency provably goes down to
O(1). Such an unpredictable random permutation is realized by the
GeneratePermutation function.
Consensus. For a round-(r + 1) unit U , by ↓(U ) we denote the set
of all round-r parents of U . Consider now a unit U0 in round r ;
we would like the result of Decide(U0,D) to “answer” the question
whether all nodes can see the unit U0. This is done through voting:
starting from round r + 1 every unit casts a “virtual" vote10 on
U0. These votes are called virtual because they are never really
9The reason is that the adversary could cause the rst Ω(N ) units to be decided 0.
Since the delay of each such decision is a geometric random variable with expectation
θ (1), the maximum of Ω(N ) of them is Ω(logN ).
10The idea of virtual voting was used for the rst time in [37].
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broadcast to other nodes, but they are computed from the ch-DAG.
For instance, at round r + 1, a unitU is said to vote 1 ifU0 < U and
0 otherwise, which directly corresponds to the intuition that the
nodes are trying to gure out whether U0 is visible or not.
Aleph-Consensus(D):
1 Vote(U0,U ,D):
2 if R(U ) 6 R(U0) + 1 then output11 [U0 < U ]
3 else
4 A← {Vote(U0,V ,D) : V ∈↓(U )}
5 if A = {σ } then output σ
6 else output CommonVote(U0,R(U ),D)
7 UnitDecide(U0,U ,D):
8 if R(U ) < R(U0) + 2 then output ⊥
9 v← CommonVote(U0,U )
10 if |{V∈↓(U ):Vote(U0,V )=v}|>2f+1 then output v
11 else output ⊥
12 Decide(U0,D):
13 if ∃U ∈DUnitDecide(U0,U ,D) = σ ∈ {0, 1} then
14 output σ
15 else output ⊥
Starting from round r + 2 every unit can either make a nal
decision on a unit or simply vote again. This process is guided
by the function CommonVote(U0, r ′,D) that provides a common
bit ∈ {0, 1} for every round r ′ > r + 2. Suppose now that U is of
round r ′ > r + 2 and at least 2f + 1 of its round-(r ′ − 1) parents
in the ch-DAG voted 1 for U0, then if CommonVote(U0, r ′,D) = 1,
then unit U is declared to decide U0 as 1. Otherwise, if either
there is no supermajority vote among parents (i.e., at least 2f + 1
matching votes) or the supermajority vote does not agree with the
CommonVote for this round, the decision is not made yet. In this
case, the unitU revotes using either the vote suggested by its par-
ents (in case it was unanimous) or using the default CommonVote.
Whenever any of the units U ∈ D decides U0 then it is considered
decided with that particular decision bit.
Crucially, the process is designed in such a way that when some
unit U decides σ ∈ {0, 1} on some unit U0 then we prove that no
unit ever decides σ (the negation of σ ) on U0 and also that every
unit of high enough round decides σ on U0 as well. At this point
it is already not hard to see that if a unit U makes decision σ on
U0 then it follows that all the units of round R(U ) (and any round
higher than that) vote σ on U0. To prove that observe that if a unit
V of round r votes σ ′ then either:
• all its parents voted σ ′ and hence σ ′ = σ , becauseU and
V have at least f + 1 parents in common, or
• σ ′ = CommonVote(U0,R(V ),D), but sinceU decidedσ for
U0 then CommonVote(U0,R(U ),D) = σ and thus σ = σ ′
because R(U ) = R(V ).
The above gives a sketch of “safety” proof of the protocol, i.e., that
there will never be inconsistent decisions regarding a unitU0.
11In the expression [U0 < U ] we use the Iverson bracket notation, i.e., [U0 < U ] = 1
if U0 < U and it is 0 otherwise.
Another property that is desirable for a consensus protocol is that
it always terminates, i.e., eventually outputs a consistent decision.
In the view of the FLP Theorem [24] this cannot be achieved in
the absence of randomness in the protocol. This is the reason why
we need to inject random bits to the protocol and this is done in
CommonVote. We show that, roughly, if CommonVote provides
a random bit (that cannot be predicted by the adversary well in
advance) then at every round the decision process terminates with
probability at least 1/2. Thus, the expected number of rounds until
termination is O(1).
We provide formal proofs of properties of the above protocol in
Section D. In the next section, we show how the randomness in the
protocol is generated to implement CommonVote.
3.3 Common Randomness
As already alluded to in Subsection 3.2, due to FLP-impossibility [24]
there is no way to achieve binary agreement in nite number of
rounds when no randomness is present in the protocol. We also
note here that not any kind of randomness will do and the mere
fact that a protocol is randomized does not “protect” it from FLP-
impossibility. It is crucial to keep the random bits hidden from the
adversary till a certain point, intuitively until the adversary has
committed to what decision to pursue for a given unit at a certain
round. When the random bit is revealed after this commitment,
then there is a probability of 1/2 that the adversary “is caught” and
cannot delay the consensus decision further.
That means, in particular, that a source of randomness where the
nodes are initialized with a common random seed and use a pseudo-
random number generator to extract fresh bits is not sucient,
since such a strategy actually makes the algorithm deterministic.
Another issue when generating randomness for the protocol
is that it should be common, thus in other words, the random bit
output by every honest node in a particular round r should agree
between nodes. While this is strictly required for safety of the
algorithm that is presented in the paragraph on Consensus, one can
also consider simple variants thereof for which a relaxed version
of commonness is sucient. More specically, if the bit output
at any round is common with probability p ∈ (0, 1] then one can
achieve consensus in O(1/p) rounds. Indeed, already in [9] Bracha
constructed such a protocol and observed that if every node locally
tosses a coin independently from the others than this becomes
a randomness source that is common with probability p ≈ 2−N
and thus gives a protocol that takes O(2N ) rounds to terminate.
We refer to Subsection 2.2 for an overview of previous work on
common randomness.
In our protocol, randomness is injected via a single procedure
SecretBits whose properties we formalize in the denition below
Definition 3.3 (Secret Bits). The SecretBits(i, revealRound)
primitive takes an index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N } and revealRound ∈ N as
parameters, outputs a λ-bits secret s , and has the following properties
whenever initiated by the ChooseHead protocol
(1) no computationally bounded adversary can guess s with
non-negligible probability, as long as no honest node has yet
created a unit of round revealRound ,
(2) the secret s can be extracted by every node that holds any
unit of round revealRound + 1.
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As one might observe, the rst parameter i of the SecretBits func-
tion seems redundant. Indeed, given an implementation of SecretBits,
we could as well use SecretBits(1, ·) in place of SecretBits(i, ·) for
any i ∈ [N ] (here and in the remaining part of the paper [N ] stands
for {1, . . . ,N }) and it would seemingly still satisfy the denition
above. The issue here is very subtle and will become clear only in
Section 4, where we construct a SecretBits function whose com-
putability is somewhat sensitive to what i it is run with12. In fact,
we recommend the reader to ignore this auxiliary parameter, as
our main implementation of SecretBits(i, revealRound) is anyway
oblivious to the value of i and thus essentially there is exactly one
secret per round in the protocol.
The simplest attempt to implement SecretBits would be perhaps
to use an external trusted party that observes the growth of the
ch-DAG and emits one secret per round, whenever the time comes.
Clearly, the correctness of the above relies crucially on the dealer
being honest, which is an assumption we cannot make: indeed if
there was such an honest entity, why do not we just let him order
transactions instead of designing such a complicated protocol?
Instead, our approach is to utilize a threshold secret scheme
(see [45]). In short, at round r every node is instructed to include
its share of the secret (that is hidden from every node) in the unit it
creates. Then, in round r +1, every node collects f +1 dierent such
shares included in the previous round and reconstructs the secret
from them. Crucially, any set of f or less shares is not enough
to derive the secret, thus the adversary controlling f nodes still
needs at least one share from an honest node. While this allows the
adversary to extract the secret one round earlier then the honest
nodes, this advantage turns out to be irrelevant, as, intuitively, he
needed to commit to certain actions several turns in advance (see
Section C for a detailed analysis).
Given the SecretBits primitive, we are ready to implement
GeneratePermutation and CommonVote (the pseudocode is given
in the table Aleph-CommonRandomness).
In the pseudocode, by hash we denote a hash function13 that
takes an input and outputs a bistring of length λ. We remark that the
CommonVote at round R(U0)+4 being 0 is to enforce that units that
are invisible at this round will be quickly decided negatively (see
Lemma C.4). To explain the intuition behind GeneratePermutation,
suppose for a second that SecretBits(i, r+4) outputs the same secret
x independently of i (as it is the case for our main algorithm). Then
the above pseudocode assigns a pseudorandom priority hash(x | |U )
(where, for brevityU denotes some serialization ofU ) to every unit
U or round r which results in a random ordering of these units, as
required.
At this point, the only remaining piece of the protocol is the
SecretBits procedure. We provide two implementations in the sub-
sequent Section (see Lemma 4.1): one simple, but requiring a trusted
dealer, and the second, more involved but completely trustless.
4 RANDOMNESS BEACON
The goal of this section is to construct an ABFT Randomness Beacon,
in order to provide an ecient implementation of SecretBits that is
12More precisely, intuitively SecretBits(i, ·) is not expected to work properly if for
instance node Pi has produced no unit at all. Also, importantly, the ChooseHead
algorithm will never call SecretBits(i, ·) in such a case.
13We work in the standard Random Oracle Model.
Aleph-CommonRandomness:
1 CommonVote(U0, r ,D):
2 if r 6 R(U0) + 3 then output 1
3 if r = R(U0) + 4 then output 0
4 else
5 i ← the creator ofU0
6 x ← SecretBits(i, r ,D)
7 if x = ⊥ then output ⊥
8 output the rst bit of hash(x)
9 GeneratePermutation(r ,D):
10 for each unitU of round r in D do
11 i ← the creator ofU
12 x ← SecretBits(i, r + 4,D)
13 if x = ⊥ then output ⊥
14 assign priority(U ) ← hash(x | |U ) ∈ {0, 1}λ
15 let (U1,U2, . . . ,Uk ) be the units in D of round r sorted by
priority(·)
16 output (U1,U2, . . . ,Uk )
required by our Atomic Broadcast protocol. We start by a detailed
review of previous works and how do they compare to the result of
this paper. Subsequently we describe how to extract randomness
from threshold signatures, which is a basic building block in our
approach, and after that we proceed with the description of our
randomness beacon.
4.1 Comparison to Previous Work on
Distributed Randomness Beacons
We distinguish two main approaches for solving the problem of gen-
erating randomness in distributed systems in the presence of byzan-
tine nodes: using Veriable Secret Sharing (VSS) and via Threshold
Signatures. We proceed to reviewing these two approaches and
subsequently explain what does our work bring to the eld. This
discussion is succinctly summarized in Table 1.
Veriable Secret Sharing. The rough idea of VSS can be explained
as follows: a dealer rst initializes a protocol to distribute shares
(x1,x2, . . . ,xN ) of a secret x to the nodes 1, 2, . . . ,N so that after-
wards every set of (f + 1) nodes can extract x by combining their
shares, but any subset of f nodes cannot do that14. An honest
dealer is requested to pick x uniformly at random (and erase x
from memory); yet as one can imagine, this alone is not enough to
build a reliable, distributed randomness source, with the main issue
being: how to elect a dealer with the guarantee that he is honest?
In the seminal paper [19] Canetti and Rabin introduce the following
trick: let all nodes in the network act as dealers and perform VSS
with the intention to combine all these secrets into one (say, by
xoring them) that would be random and unpredictable. Turning
this idea into an actual protocol that works under full asynchrony
is especially tricky, yet [19] manage to do that and end up with a
protocol that has O(N 7) communication complexity. This O(N 7)
essentially comes from executing an O(N 5) communication VSS
protocol N 2 times. Later on this has been improved by Cachin et
14The thresholds f and (f + 1) here are not the only possible, but are most relevant
for our setting, see [14] for a more detailed treatment.
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al. [14] to O(N 4) by making the VSS protocol more ecient. The
issue with the AVSS approach is that the communication cost of
generating one portion of randomness is rather high – it requires to
start everything from scratch when new random bits are requested.
This issue is not present in the approach based on threshold signa-
tures, where a one-time setup is run and then multiple portions of
random bits can be generated cheaply.
Threshold Signatures. For a technical introduction to this ap-
proach we refer to Section 4.2. The main idea is that if the nodes
hold keys for threshold signatures with threshold f + 1, then the
threshold signature σm ∈ {0, 1}λ of a messagem is unpredictable
for the adversary and provides us with roughly λ bits of entropy.
The idea of using threshold signatures as a source of randomness
is not new and has been studied in the literature [16], especially
in the context of blockchain [28, 35]. While this technique indeed
produces unbiased randomness assuming that the tossing keys
have been correctly dealt to all nodes, the true challenge becomes:
How to deal secret keys without involving a trusted dealer? This
problem is known in the literature under the name of Distributed
Key Generation (DKG). There has been a lot of prior work on
DKG [25, 26, 29, 41], however none of the so far proposed protocols
has been designed to run under full asynchrony.
Historically, the rst implemenation of DKG was proposed in the
work of Pedersen [41]. The network model is not formally specied
in [41], yet one can implement it in the synchronous BFT model with
f out of N = 3f + 1 nodes being malicious. Pedersen’s protocol,
as later shown by Gennaro et al. in [26], does not guarantee a
uniform distribution over private keys; in the same work [26] a
x is proposed that closes this gap, but also in a later work [25]
by the same set of authors it is shown that Pedersen’s protocol is
still secure15. The DFINITY randomness beacon [28] runs DKG
as setup and subsequently uses threshold signatures to generate
randomness.
We note that the AVSS scheme by Cachin et al. [14] can be also
used as a basis of DKG since it is polynomial-based and has the
additional property of every node learning a certain "commitment"
to the secret shares obtained by all the nodes, which in the setting
of threshold signatures corresponds to public keys of the threshold
scheme (see Section 4.2). This allows to construct a DKG protocol as
follows: each node runs its own instance of AVSS and subsequently
the nodes agree on a subset of > f +1 such dealt secrets to build the
keys for threshold signatures. This scheme looks fairly simple, yet it
is extremely tricky to implement correctly. One issue is security, i.e.,
making sure that the adversary is not "front-running" and cannot
reveal any secret too early, but more fundamentally: this algorithm
requires consensus to chooses a subset of secrets. ABFT consensus
requires randomness (by FLP theorem [24]), which we are trying
to obtain, and thus we fall into an innite loop. To obtain consensus
without the help of a trusted dealer one is forced to use variants
of the Canetti-Rabin protocol [19] (recall that we are working here
under the hard constraint of having no trusted dealer, which is not
satised by most protocols in the literature) that unfortunately has
very high communication complexity. Nevertheless using this idea,
one can obtain an ABFT DKG protocol with O(N 4) communication
15We note that out protocol can be seen as an adaptation of Pedersen’s and thus also
requires an ad-hoc proof of security (provided in Lemma E.4), as the distribution of
secret keys might be skewed.
Protocol Model CommunicationSetup Query
This Work async. BFT O(N 2 logN ) O(N )
Canetti, Rabin [19] async. BFT - O(N 7)
Cachin et al. [14] async. BFT - O(N 4)
Kate et al. DKG [29] w. sync. BFT O(N 3) -
Pedersen DKG [25, 41] sync. BFT O(N 2) -
Gennaro et al. DKG [26] sync. BFT O(N 2) -
DFINITY [28] sync. BFT O(N 2) O(N )
RandShare [46] sync. BFT - O(N 2)
SCRAPE [20] sync. BFT - O(N 2)
Table 1: Comparison of randomness beacons. The Model
column species what are the necessary assumptions for
the protocol to work. The Communication columns specify
communication complexities (per node) of a one-time setup
phase (run at the very beginning), and of one query for fresh
random bits. Some of themwere designed for DKG and thus
we donot specify the complexity of query (yet it can bemade
O(N ) in all cases). Some protocols also do not run any setup
phase, in which case the complexity is omitted.
complexity. The approach of [29] uses the ideas of [14] and roughly
follows the above outlined idea, but avoids the problem of consensus
by working in a relaxed model: weak synchrony (which lies in
between partial synchrony and full asynchrony).
Our Approach. We base our randomness beacon on threshold
signatures, yet make a crucial observation that full DKG is not
necessary for this purpose. Indeed what we run instead as setup
(key generation phase) of our randomness beacon is a weaker vari-
ant of DKG. Very roughly: the end result of this variant is that the
keys are dealt to a subset of at least 2f + 1 nodes (thus possibly up
to f nodes end up without keys). This allows us to construct a pro-
tocol with setup that incurs only O˜(N 2) communication, whereas
a variant with full DKG16 would require O˜(N 3).
To obtain such a setup in an asynchronous setting we need to
deal with the problem (that was sketched in the previous para-
graph) of reaching consensus without having a common source of
randomness in place. Intuitively a “disentanglement" of these two
problems seems hard: in one direction this can be made formal via
FLP Theorem [24] (consensus requires randomness); in the opposite
direction, intuitively, generating a common coin toss requires all
the nodes to agree on a particular random bit.
Canetti and Rabin present an interesting way to circumvent
this problem in [19]: their consensus algorithm requires only a
"weak coin", i.e., a source of randomness that is common (among
nodes) with constant, non-zero probability (and is allowed to give
dierent results for dierent nodes otherwise). Then, via a beautiful
construction they obtain such a randomness source that (crucially)
does not require any consensus.
Our way to deal with this problem is dierent. Roughly speaking:
in the setup each node "constructs" its unbiased source of random-
ness and reliably broadcasts it to the remaining nodes. Thus after
16We do not describe this variant in this paper; it can be obtained by replacing uni-
variate by bivariate polynomials and adjusting the protocol accordingly (see [14]).
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this step, the problem becomes to pick one out of N randomness
sources (consensus). To this end we make a binary decision on each
of these sources and pick as our randomness beacon the rst that
obtained a decision of “1"; however each of these binary consensus
instances uses its own particular source of randomness (the one it
is making a decision about). At the same time we make sure that
the nodes that were late with showing their randomness sources to
others will be always decided 0. While this is the basic idea behind
our approach, there are several nontrivial gaps to be lled in order
to obtain O˜(N 2) communication complexity and O(1) latency.
Other Designs. More recently, in the work of [46] a randomness
source RandShare has been introduced, which runs a certain variant
of Pedersen’s protocol to extract random bits. The protocol is
claimed by the authors to work in the asynchronous model, yet
fails to achieve that goal, as any protocol that waits for messages
from all the nodes to proceed, fails to achieve liveness under
asynchrony (or even under partial synchrony). In the Table 1 we
list it as synchronous BFT, as after some adjustments it can be made
to run in this model. In the same work [46] two other randomness
beacons are also proposed: RandHound and RandHerd, yet both of
them rely on strong, non-standard assumptions about the network
and the adversary and thus we do not include them in Table 1. The
method used by SCRAPE [20] at a high level resembles Pedersen’s
protocol but requires access to a blockchain in order to have a total
order on messages sent out during the protocol executation.
Finally, we mention an interesting line of work on generating
randomness based on VDFs (Veriable Delay Functions [7, 34, 42,
47]). Very roughly, the idea is to turn a biasable randomness (such
as the hash of a Bitcoin block) into unbiasable randomness via a
VDF, i.e., a function f : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ that cannot be computed
quickly and whose computation cannot be parallelized, yet it is
possible to prove that f (x) = y for a given y much faster than
actually computing f (x). The security of this approach relies on
the assumption that the adversary cannot evaluate f at random
inputs much faster than honest participants.
4.2 Randomness from Threshold Signatures
In this subsection we present the main cryptographic component
of our construction: generating randomness using Threshold Sig-
natures. When using a trusted dealer, this component is already
enough to implement SecretBits, but the bulk of this section is
devoted to proving that we can eliminate the need for a trusted
dealer.
Randomness through Signatures. The main idea for generating
randomness is as follows: suppose that there is a key pair (tk,vk)
of private key and public key, such that tk is unknown, while vk is
public, and tk allows to sign messages for some public-key crypto-
system that is deterministic17. (We refer to tk as to the “tossing
key" while vk stands for “verication key"; we use these names to
distinguish from the regular private-public key pairs held by the
nodes.) Then, for any messagem, its digital signature σm generated
with respect to tk cannot be guessed, but can be veried using vk ,
thus hash(σm ) ∈ {0, 1}λ provides us with λ random bits! There
seems to be a contradiction here though: how can the tossing key
17A system that for a given message m there exists only one correct signature for key
pair (tk, vk).
be secret and at the same time we are able to sign messages with
it? Surprisingly, this is possible using Threshold Cryptography: the
tossing key tk is “cut into pieces" and distributed among N nodes
so that they can jointly sign messages using this key but no node
(or a group of dishonest nodes) can learn tk .
More specically, we use a threshold signature scheme built
upon BLS signatures [8]. Such a scheme works over a GDH group
G , i.e., a group in which the computational Die-Hellman problem
is hard (i.e. computing дxy given дx ,дy ∈ G) but the decisional
Die-Hellman problem is easy (i.e. verifying that z = xy given
дx ,дy ,дz ∈ G). For more details and constructions of such groups
we refer the reader to [8]. We assume from now on that G is a
xed, cyclic, GDH group generated by д ∈ G and that the order
of G is a large prime q. A tossing key tk in BLS is generated as a
random element in Zq and the public key is y = дtk . A signature of
a messagem is simply σm = m˜tk , where m˜ ∈ G is the hash (see [8]
for a construction of such hash functions) of the message being a
random element of G.
Distributing the Tossing Key. To distribute the secret tossing
key among all nodes, the Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme [45]
is employed. A trusted dealer generates a random tossing key
tk along with a random polynomial A of degree f over Zq such
that A(0) = tk and privately sends tki = A(i) to every node i =
1, 2, . . . ,N . The dealer also publishes verication keys, i.e., VK =
(дtk1 , . . . ,дtkN ). Now, whenever a signature of a messagem needs
to be generated, the nodes generate shares of the signature by
signingm with their tossing keys, i.e., each node i multicasts m˜A(i).
The main observation to make is that now m˜A(0) can be computed
given only m˜A(j) for f + 1 dierent j’s (by interpolation) and thus
it is enough for a node Pj to multicast m˜A(j) as its share and collect
f such shares from dierent nodes to recover σm . On the other
hand, any collection of at most f shares is not enough to do that,
therefore the adversary cannot sign m all by himself. For details,
we refer to the pseudocode of ThresholdSignatures.
SecretBits Through Threshold Signatures. Given the just intro-
duce machinery of threshold signatures, the SecretBits(i, r ) prim-
itive is straightforward to implement. Moreover, as promised in
Section 3, we give here an implementation that is oblivious to its
rst argument, i.e., it does only depend on r , but not on i .
First of all, there is a setup phase whose purpose is to deal keys for
generating secrets to all nodes. We start by giving a simple version
in which an honest dealer is required for the setup. Subsequently,
we explain how can this be replaced by a trustless setup, to yield
the nal version of SecretBits.
In the simpler case, the trusted dealer generates tossing keys and
verication keys (TK ,VK) for all the nodes using theGenerateKeys
procedure, and then openly broadcastsVK to all nodes and to every
node i he secretly sends the tossing key tki .
Given such a setup, when SecretBits(j, r ) is executed by the pro-
tocol, every node i can simply ignore the j argument and generate
si (m) ← CreateShare(m, tki )
wherem is a nonce determined from the round number, saym = “r”.
Next, after creating its round-(r + 1) unitU , the Pi collects all the
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ThresholdSignatures:
1 GenerateKeys():
2 Let G = 〈д〉 be a GDH group of prime order q
3 generate a random polynomial A of degree f over Zq
4 let TK = (tk1, . . . , tkN ) with tki = A(i) for i ∈ [N ],
5 let VK = (vk1, . . . ,vkN ) with vki = дtki for i ∈ [N ]
6 output (TK ,VK)
7 CreateShare(m, tki):
8 m˜ ← hash(m)
9 output m˜tki
10 VerifyShare(m, s, i,VK):
11 m˜ ← hash(m)
/* can do the check below since G is GDH */
12 if logд(vki ) = logm˜ (s) then
13 output True
14 else output False
15 GenerateSignature(m, S,VK):
/* Let S = {(si , i)}i ∈P where |P | = f + 1 */
/* Assume ∀j VerifyShare(m, sj , i j ) = True */
16 interpolate A(0), i.e., nd l1, l2, . . . , lf +1 ∈ Zq s.t.
A(0) = ∑f +1j=1 ljA(i j )
17 σm ←∏f +1j=1 sljj
18 output σm
shares S included in U ’s parents at round r and computes:
σm ← GenerateSignature(m, S,VK)
s(m) ← hash(σm )
and s(m) ∈ {0, 1}λ is meant as the output of SecretBits(·, r ).
Finally, to get rid of the trusted dealer, in Subsection 4.3 we
describe a trustless protocol that performs the setup instead of
a trusted dealer. The crucial dierence is that the keys are not
generated by one entity, but jointly by all the nodes. Moreover,
in the asynchronous version of the setup, every honest node i
learns the verication key VK , some key tki and a set of “share
dealers” T ⊆ [N ] of size 2f + 1, such that every node Pi with
i ∈ T has a correct tossing key tki . This, while being slightly
weaker than the outcome of the setup of trusted dealer, still allows
to implement SecretBits as demostrated in the below lemma.
Lemma 4.1 (Secret Bits). The above scheme in both versions
(with and without trusted dealer) correctly implements SecretBits.
We refer the reader to Subsection E for a proof.
4.3 Randomness Beacon with Trustless Setup
In Section 4.2 we have discussed how to implement a Randomness
Beacon based on a trusted dealer. Here, we devise a version of this
protocol that has all the benets of the previous one and at the
same time is completely trustless. For the sake of clarity, we rst
provide a high level perspective of the new ideas and how do they
combine to give a trustless Randomness Beacon, next we provide
a short summary of the protocol in the form of a very informal
pseudocode, and nally we ll in the gaps by giving details on how
the specic parts are implemented and glued together.
Key Boxes. Since no trusted dealer is available, perhaps the most
natural idea is to let all the nodes serve as dealers simultaneously.
More precisely we let every node emit (via RBC, i.e., by placing it
as data in a unit) a tossing Key Box that is constructed by a node k
(acting as a dealer) as follows:
• as in GenerateKeys(), sample a random polynomial
Ak (x) =
f∑
j=0
ak, jx
j ∈ Zq [x]
of degree f ,
• compute a commitment to Ak as
Ck = (дak,0 ,дak,1 , . . . ,дak, f ).
• dene the tossing keys TKk and verication keys VKk
tkk,i := Ak (i) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
vkk,i := дtki for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N .
Note that in particular each verication key vkk,i for i ∈
[N ] can be computed from the commitment Ck as vkk,i =∏f
j=0C
i j
k, j .
• encrypt the tossing keys for every node i using the dedi-
cated public key18 pkk→i as
ek,i := Enck→i
(
tkk,i
)
and let Ek := (ek,1, ek,2, . . . , ek,N ).
• the kth key box is dened as KBk = (Ck ,Ek ).
In our protocol, every node Pk generates its own key box KBk and
places (Ck ,Ek ) in his unit of round 0. We dene the kth key set to be
KSk = (VKk ,TKk ) and note that given the key boxKBk = (Ck ,Ek ),
every node can reconstruct VKk and moreover, every node i can
decrypt his tossing key tkk,i from the encrypted part Ek , but is not
able to extract the remaining keys. The encypted tossing keys Ek
can be seen as a certain way of emulating "authenticated channels".
Verifying Key Sets. Since at least 2/3 of nodes are honest, we also
know that 2/3 of all the key sets are safe to use, because they were
produced by honest nodes who properly generated the key sets and
the corresponding key boxes an erased the underlying polynomial
(and thus all the tossing keys). Unfortunately, it is not possible to
gure out which nodes cheated in this process (and kept the tossing
keys that were supposed to be erased).
What is even harder to check, is whether a certain publicly
known key box KBk was generated according to the instructions
above. Indeed, as a node Pi we have access only to our tossing
key tkk,i and while we can verify that this key agrees with the
verication key (check if дtkk,i = vkk,i ), we cannot do that for
the remaining keys that are held by other nodes. The only way to
perform verication of the key sets is to do that in collaboration
with other nodes. Thus, in the protocol, there is a round at which
18We assume that as part of PKI setup each node i is given exactly N dierent key
pairs for encryption: (skk→i , pkk→i ) for k ∈ [N ]. The key pkk→i is meant to be
used by the k th node to encrypt a message whose recipient is i (denoted as Enck→i (·)).
This setup is merely for simplicity of arguments – one could instead have one key per
node if using veriable encryption or double encryption with labels.
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every node “votes” for correctness of all the key sets it has seen so
far. As will be explained in detail later, these votes cannot be “faked”
in the following sense: if a node Pi votes on a key set KSk being
incorrect, it needs to provide a proof that its key tkk,i (decrypted
from ek,i ) is invalid, which cannot be done if Pk is an honest dealer.
Thus consequently, dishonest nodes cannot deceive the others that
a valid key set is incorrect.
Choosing Trusted Key Sets. At a later round these votes are
collected and summarized locally by every node Pi and a trusted
set of key sets Ti ⊆ [N ] is determined. Intuitively, Ti is the set of
indices k of key sets such that:
• the node Pi is familiar with KBk ,
• the node Pi has seen enough votes on KSk correctness
that it is certain that generating secrets from KSk will be
successful,
The second condition is determined based solely on the ch-DAG
structure below the ith node unit at a particular round. What will
be soon important is that, even though the setsTi do not necessarily
coincide for dierent i , it is guaranteed that |Ti | > f + 1 for every
i , and thus crucially at least one honest key set is included in each
of them.
Combining Tosses. We note that once the set Ti is determined
for some index i ∈ [N ], this set essentially denes a global common
source of randomness that cannot be biased by an adversary. Indeed,
suppose we would like to extract the random bits corresponding
to nonce m. First, in a given round, say r , every node should
include its share for noncem corresponding to every key set that it
voted as being correct. In the next round, it is guaranteed that the
shares included in round r are enough to recover the random secret
σm,k =m
Ak (0) ∈ G (the threshold signature ofm generated using
key set KSk ) for every k ∈ Ti . Since up to f out of these secrets
might be generated by the adversary, we simply take
τm,i :=
∏
k ∈Ti
σm,k =m
∑
k∈Ti Ak (0) ∈ G
to obtain a uniformly random element ofG and thus (by hashing it)
a random bitstring of length λ corresponding to node Pi , resulting
from nonce m. From now on we refer to the ith such source of
randomness (i.e., corresponding to Pi ) as MultiCoini .
Agreeing onCommonMultiCoin. So far we have said that every
node Pi denes locally its strong source of randomness MultiCoini .
Note however that paradoxically, this abundance of randomness
sources is actually problematic: which one shall be used by all the
nodes to have a “truly common” source of randomness? This is
nothing other than a problem of “selecting a head”, i.e., choosing one
unit from a round – a problem that we already solved in Section 3!
At this point however, an attentive reader is likely to object, as the
algorithm from Section 3 only works provided a common source of
randomness. Therefore, the argument seems to be cyclic as we are
trying to construct such a source of randomness from the algorithm
from Section 3. Indeed, great care is required here: as explained in
Section 3, all what is required for the ChooseHead protocol to work
is a primitive SecretBits(i, r ) that is supposed to inject a secret of λ
bits at the r th round of the protocol. Not going too deep into details,
we can appropriately implement such a method by employing the
MultiCoins we have at our disposal. This part, along with the
construction of MultiCoins, constitutes the technical core of the
whole protocol.
Combining Key Sets. Finally, once the head is chosen to be
l ∈ [N ], from now on one could use MultiCoinl as the common
source of randomness. If one does not care about savings in com-
munication and computational complexity, then the construction is
over. Otherwise, observe that tossing the MultiCoinl at a noncem
requires in the worst case N shares from every single node. This is
sub-optimal, and here is a simple way to reduce it to just 1 share per
node. Recall that every Key Set KSk that contributes to MultiCoinl
is generated from a polynomial Ak ∈ Zq [x] of degree f . It is not
hard to see that by simple algebraic manipulations one can combine
the tossing keys and all the verication keys of all key sets KSk for
k ∈ Tl so that the resulting Key Set corresponds to the sum of these
polynomials
A(x) := ©­«
∑
k ∈Tl
Ak (x)ª®¬ ∈ Zq [x].
This gives a source of randomness that requires one share per nonce
from every node; note that since the set Tl contains at least one
honest node, the polynomial A can be considered random.
Protocol Sketch. We are now ready to provide an informal sketch
of the Setup protocol and Toss protocol, see the ABFT − Beacon
box below. The content of the box is mostly a succinct summary of
Section 4.3. What might be unclear at this point is the condition of
the if statement in the Toss function. It states that the tossing key
tki is supposed to be correct in order to produce a share: indeed it
can happen that one of the key boxes that is part of the MultiCoinl
does not provide a correct tossing key for the ith node, in which case
the combined tossing key tki cannot be correct either. This however
is not a problem, as the protocol still guarantees that at least 2f + 1
nodes hold correct combined tossing keys, and thus there will be
always enough shares at our disposal to run ExtractBits.
4.4 Details of the Setup
We provide some more details regarding several components of the
Setup phase of ABFT − Beacon that were treated informally in the
previous subsection.
Voting on Key Sets. Just before creating the unit at round 3 the
ith node is supposed to inspect all the key boxes that are present in
its current copy of the ch-DAG. Suppose KBk for some k ∈ [N ] is
one of such key sets. The only piece of information about KBk that
is known to Pi but hidden from the remaining nodes is its tossing
key. Node Pi recovers this key by decrypting it using its secret key
(dedicated for k) skk→i
tkk,i ← Deck→i (ek,i ).
Now, if node Pk is dishonest, it might have included an incorrect
tossing key, to check correctness, the ith node veries whether
дtkk,i
?
= vkk,i ,
where д is the xed generator of the group G we are working over.
The ith node includes the following piece of information in its
round-3 unit
VerKey (KBk , i) =
{
1 if tkk,i correct
Deck→i (ek,i ) oth.
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ABFT-Beacon:
1 Setup():
/* Instructions for node Pi. */
2 Initialize growing the ch-DAG D
3 In the data eld of your units include (as specied in
Section 4.4):
4 At round 0: a key box KBi ,
5 At round 3: votes regarding correctness of key boxes
present in D,
6 At rounds > 6: shares necessary to extract
randomness from SecretBits.
7 Run ChooseHead to determine the head unit at round 6
and let l be its creator.
8 Combine the key sets {KSj : j ∈ Tl } and let (tki ,VK) be
the corresponding tossing key and verication keys.
9 Toss(m):
/* Code for node Pi. */
10 if tki is correct then
11 si ← CreateShare(m, tki )
12 multicast (si , i)
13 wait until receiving a set of f + 1 valid shares S
/* validity is checked using VerifyShare() */
14 output σm := ExtractBits(m, S,VK)
Note that if a node Pi votes that KBk is incorrect (by including
the bottom option of VerKey in its unit) it cannot lie, since other
nodes can verify whether the plaintext it provided agrees with
the ciphertext in KBk (as the encryption scheme is assumed to be
deterministic) and if that is not the case, they treat a unit with
such a vote as invalid (and thus not include it in their ch-DAG).
Thus, consequently, the only way dishonest nodes could cheat here
is by providing positive votes for incorrect key boxes. This can
not harm honest nodes, because by positively verifying some key
set a node declares that from now on it will be providing shares
for this particular key set whenever requested. If in reality the
corresponding tossing key is not available to this node, it will not be
able to create such shares and hence all its units will be henceforth
considered invalid.
One important property this scheme has is that it is safe for an
honest recipient Pi of ek,i to reveal the plaintext decryption of
ek,i in case it is not (as expected) the tossing key tkk,i – indeed if
Pk is dishonest then either he actually encrypted some data d in
ek,i in which case he learns nothing new (because d is revealed)
or otherwise he obtained ek,i by some other means, in which case
Deck→i (ek,i ) is a random string, because no honest node ever
creates a ciphertext encrypted with pk→i and we assume that the
encryption scheme is semantically secure. Note also that if instead
of having N key pairs per node we used a similar scheme with
every node having just one key pair, then the adversary could
reveal some tossing keys of honest nodes through the following
attack: the adversary copies an honest node’s (say jth) ciphertext
ej,i and includes it as ek,i in which case Pi is forced to reveal
Deci (ej,i ) = tkj,i which should have remained secret! This is the
reason why we need dedicated key pairs for every pair of nodes.
Forming MultiCoins. The unit V := U [i; 6] created by the ith
node in round 6 denes a set Ti ⊆ [N ] as follows: k ∈ N is consid-
ered an element of Ti if and only if all the three conditions below
are met
(1) U [k ; 0] 6 V ,
(2) For every j ∈ [N ] such that U [j; 3] 6 V it holds that
VerKey (KBk , j) = 1.
At this point it is important to note that every node that hasU [i; 6]
in its copy of the ch-DAG can compute Ti as all the conditions
above can be checked deterministically given only the ch-DAG.
SecretBits viaMultiCoins. Recall that to implementCommonVote
and GeneratePermutation it suces to implement a more general
primitive SecretBits(i, r )whose purpose is to inject a secret at round
r that can be recovered by every node in round r + 1 but cannot be
recovered by the adversary till at least one honest node has created
a unit of round r .
The technical subtlety that becomes crucial here is that the
SecretBits(i, r ) is only called for r > 9 and only by nodes that have
U [i; 6] in their local ch-DAG (see Lemma E.3). More specically,
this allows us to implement SecretBits(i, ·) through MultiCoini .
The rationale behind doing so is that every node that seesU [i; 6]
can also see all the Key Sets that comprise the ith MultiCoin and
thus consequently it “knows” what MultiCoini is19.
Suppose now that we would like to inject a secret at round r for
index i ∈ [N ]. Dene a noncem := “i||r” and request all the nodes
Pk such that U [i; 6] 6 U [k, r ] to include in U [k, r ] a share for the
noncem for every Key Set KS j such that j ∈ Ti . In addition, if Pk
voted that KSj is incorrect in round 3, or Pk did not vote for KBj
at all (since KBj was not yet available to him at round 3) then Pk
is not obligated to include a share (note that its unit U [k, 3] that is
below U [k, r ] contains evidence that its key was incorrect).
As we then show in Section 4.4, given any unit U ∈ D of round
r + 1 one can then extract the value of MultiCoini from the shares
present in round-r units in D. Thus, consequently, the value of
SecretBits(i, r ) in a ch-DAG D is available whenever any unit in
D has round > r + 1, hence we arrive at
Lemma 4.2 (Secret Bits from Multicoins). The above dened
scheme based on MultiCoins correctly implements SecretBits.
The proof of the above lemma is provided in Section E.
5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First of all, authors would like to thank Matthew Niemerg for intro-
ducing us to the topic, constant support, and countless hours spent
on valuable discussions. Additionally, we would like to show our
gratitude to Michał Handzlik, Tomasz Kisielewki, Maciej Gawron,
and Łukasz Lachowski, for reading the paper, proposing changes
that improved its consistency and readability, and discussions that
helped us to make the paper easier to understand.
This research was funded by the Aleph Zero Foundation.
19We epmhasize that using a xed MultiCoin, for instance MultiCoin1 would not be
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A PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The protocol that we described in the main body of the paper has
excellent theoretical properties and achieves optimal asymptotic
guarantees, however in the original form might not be viable for
practical implementation. The high level reason for that is that it
was designed to operate in the harshest possible adversarial setting
(i.e. the adversary controlling f out of 3f + 1 nodes and being
able to arbitrarily delay messages) and it was not optimized for the
"optimistic case". This means intuitively that as of now, the protocol
can withstand arbitrarily oppressive "attacks" of the adversary, but
does not get any faster when no attacks take place.
In this section we present several adjustments to the protocol
that allow us to make it signicantly faster in the optimistic case,
without compromising its strong security guarantees. As a conse-
quence, we obtain a version of the protocol that is well suited for
practical implementation – we show in particular (see Section C.3)
that under partial synchrony it matches the optimistic 3-round
validation delay of PBFT and Tendermint [11, 21].
Below, we list the main sources of practical ineciency of the
protocol:
(1) The reliance on RBC: each DAG-round eectively takes
3 async-rounds, so in practice the protocol requires more
rounds than simple synchronous or partially synchronous
protocols such as PBFT. Furthermore, performing Ω(N )
instances of RBC simultaneusly by a node, forces it to send
Ω(N 2) distinct messages per round, which might not be
feasible.
(2) The worst-case assumption that the adversary can pretty
much arbitrarily manipulate the structure of the ch-DAG
forces the randomness to be revealed with large delay and
causes ineciency.
(3) The total size of metadata (total size of units, ignoring trans-
actions) produced in one round by all the nodes is quite
large: Ω(N 2λ) bits, because each round-r unit contains
hashes of Ω(N ) units from round r − 1.
We show how to solve these three issues in Sections A.1, A.2
and A.3 respectively.
A.1 From RBC to Multicast and Random
Gossip
As a practical solution, we propose to use a combination of mul-
ticast and random gossip in place of RBC to share the ch-DAG
between nodes. More specically, the following ick-DAG-Grow
algorithm is meant to replace the DAG-Grow from the main body
(based on RBC).
At this point we emphasize that while we believe that our pro-
posal yields a truly ecient algorithm, it is rather cumbersome to
formally reason about the communication complexity of such a
solution (specically about the gossip part) and we do not attempt
ick-DAG-Grow(D):
1 CreateUnit(data):
2 for r = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
3 if r>0 then
4 wait until |{U ∈ D : R(U ) = r − 1}| > 2f + 1
5 P ← {maximal Pi ’s unit of round < r in D : Pi ∈ P}
6 create a new unitU with P as parents
7 include data in U
8 addU to D
9 multicastU
10 ReceiveUnits:
11 loop forever
12 upon receiving a unitU do
13 if U is correct then addU to buer B
14 while exists V ∈ B whose all parents are in D do
15 move V from B to D
16 Gossip:
/* Run by node i */
17 loop forever
18 j ← randomly sampled node
19 send j concise info about Di
20 receive all units in Dj \ Di
21 send all units in Di \ Dj
to provide a formal treatment. Instead, in a practical implementa-
tion one needs to include a set of rules that make it impossible for
malicious nodes to request the same data over and over again (in
order to slow down honest nodes). To analyze further eects of
switching from RBC to multicast + gossip, recall that RBC in the
original protocol allows us to solve the following two problems
(1) the data availability problem, as a given piece of data is
locally output by an honest node in RBC only when it is
guaranteed to be eventually output by every other honest
node,
(2) the problem of forks, since only one version of each unit
may be locally output by an honest node.
The data availability problem, we discuss in Section A.1.1. Regard-
ing forks: their existence in the ch-DAG does not pose a threat
to the theoretical properties of our consensus protocol. Indeed,
in Section C.2 we show that the protocol is guaranteed to reach
consensus even in the presence of forks in ch-DAG. The only (yet
serious) problem with forks is that if malicious nodes produce a lot
of them and all these forks need to be processed by honest nodes,
this can cause crashes due to lack of resources, i.e., RAM or disc
space. To counter this issue we add an auxiliary mechanism to
the protocol whose purpose is bounding the number of possible
forks (see Section A.1.2). Additionally, we show that without a
very specic set of precautions, such an attack is rather simple to
conduct and, to best of our knowledge, aects most of the currently
proposed DAG-based protocols. We formalize it as a Fork Bomb
attack in section H.
A.1.1 Ensuring data availability via gossip. Suppose for a mo-
ment that we have multicast as the only mechanism for sending
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units to other nodes (i.e., the creator multicasts his newly created
unit to all the nodes). While this is clearly the fastest way to dis-
seminate information through a network, it is certainly prone to
adversarial attacks on data availability. This is a consequence of
the fact that only the creator of this unit would then share it with
other nodes. Hence, if the creator is malicious, it may introduce
intentional inconsistencies in local copies of ch-DAGs stored by
honest nodes by sending newly created units only to some part of
the network or even sending dierent variants to dierent nodes.
To see that such an attack can not be trivially countered, let us
explore possible scenarios, depending on the particular rules of
unit creation:
• If node i is allowed to choose a unit U as a parent for
its newly created unit V despite the fact that it does not
know the whole “context“ of U (i.e., it does not have all of
U ’s parents in its local copy of ch-DAG), then we risk that
the functions Vote(V , ·) and UnitDecide(V , ·) will never
succeed to terminate with a non-⊥ verdict. Hence, node i
may never be able to make a decision about V .
• If on the other hand i is not allowed to choose U as a
parent in such a case, then the growth of ch-DAG may
stall. Indeed, another honest node might have created U
with a parentW that was available to him but not i (because
W was created by a malicious node).
Hence it seems that to counter such intentional or unintentional
(resulting for example from temporary network failures) inconsis-
tencies, there has to be a mechanism in place that allows nodes to
exchange information about units they did not produce. To this
end in the ick-DAG-Grow protocol each node regularly reconcil-
iates its local version of the ch-DAG with randomly chosen peers,
in a gossip-like fashion. Since each two honest nodes sync with
each other innitely often (with probability 1), this guarantees data
availability.
A.1.2 Bounding the number of forks. We introduce a mechanism
that bounds the number of possible forks to N variants (or rather
"branches") per node.
Note that if a (dishonest) node starts broadcasting a forked unit,
this is quickly noticed by all honest nodes, and the forker can be
banned after such an incident. Note however that we cannot reliably
“rollback" the ch-DAG to a version before the fork has happened,
as two dierent honest nodes might have already build their units
on two dierent fork branches. Still, since units are signed by their
creators, the forker can be proven to be malicious and punished
accordingly, for example by slashing its stake. This means that the
situation when a malicious node just creates a small number of
variants of a unit is not really dangerous – it will be detected quite
soon and this node will be banned forever.
What might be potentially dangerous though is when a group
of malicious nodes collaborate to build a multi-level "Fork Bomb"
(Section H) composed of a huge number of units and the honest
nodes are forced to download them all, which could lead to crashes.
This is the main motivation behind introducing the alert protocol.
We note that sending a unit via RBC can be thought of as “com-
mitting” to a single variant of a unit. In the absence of RBC the
simplest attack of an adversary would be to send a dierent variant
of a unit to every node. Since just after receiving this unit, honest
nodes cannot be aware of all the dierent variants, each of them
might legally use a dierent variant as its parent. This means that
there is no way to bound the number of dierent variants of one
forked unit in the ch-DAG by less than N and we would like to
propose a mechanism that does not allow to create more (while
without any additional rules there might be an exponential number
of variants – see Section H).
In the solution we propose every node must “commit” to at most
one variant of every received unit, by analogy to what happens in
RBC. The general rule is that honest nodes can accept only those
units that someone committed to. By default (when no forks are
yet detected), the commitment will be simply realized by creating
a next round unit that has one particular variant as its parent. On
the other hand, if a fork is observed, then every node will have to
send its commitment using RBC, to prevent attacks akin to the fork
bomb (Section H).
A node can work in one of two states: normal and alert. In
the normal state, the node multicasts its own units, gossips with
other nodes, and builds its local copy of the ch-DAG. Now assume
that a node k detects a fork, i.e., obtains two distinct variants U1
and U2 of the round-r unit created by i . Then node k enters the
alert mode. It stops building the ch-DAG and broadcasts a special
message Alert(k, i) using RBC. The message consists of three parts:
(1) Proof of node i being malicious, i.e., the pair (U1,U2).
(2) The hash and the round number of the unit of highest
round created by node i that is currently present in Dk
(possibly null).
(3) The alert id (every node assigns numeric ids to its alerts, ie.,
id = 0, 1, 2, . . . and never starts a new alert before nishing
the previous one).
By broadcasting the hash, node k commits to a single variant of
a whole chain of units created by node i , up to the one of highest
round, currently known by node k . Since up to this point node k
did not know that node i was malicious, then indeed units created
by node i in Dk form a chain.
Implementing this part requires some additional care, since now
units cannot be validated and added one by one. Also, the sender
should start with proving that the highest unit actually exists (by
showing the unit and the set of its parents), so a malicious node
cannot send arbitrarily large chunks of units, that cannot be parsed
individually.
At this point we also note that since every node performs its
alerts sequentially (by assigning numbers to them), in the worst
case there can be at most O(N ) alerts run in parallel.
We now provide details on how a node should behave after a
fork is discovered. Assume that node k is honest, and i is malicious
(forking).
(1) Node k stops communicating with node i immediately after
obtaining a proof that i is malicious.
(2) Immediately after obtaining a proof that i is malicious,
node k enters the alert mode, and broadcasts Alert(k, i).
(3) Node k can issue at most one Alert(k, ·) at once, and alerts
must be numbered consecutively.
(4) Node k cannot participate in Alert(j, ·) if it has not locally
terminated all previous alerts issued by node j.
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(5) Node k exits alert mode immediately after Alert(k, i) ends
locally for k , and stores locally the proof of nishing the
alert, along with the proof that node i is malicious.
(6) After exiting the alert mode, node k can still accept units
created by i , but only if they are below at least one unit
that some other node committed to.
The ick-DAG-Grow protocol enriched by the alert mechanism
implemented through the above rules can serve as a reliable way to
grow a ch-DAG that provably contains at most N forks per node.
More specically, in Section B.2 we prove the following
Theorem A.1. Protocol ick-DAG-Grow with alert system is
reliable and growing (as in denition 3.2). Additionally, every unit
can be forked at most N times.
A.2 Adjustments to the Consensus Mechanism
In Aleph protocol the mechanism of choosing round heads is de-
signed in a way such that no matter whether the adversary is
involved or not, the head is chosen in an expected constant number
of rounds. While this is optimal from the theoretical perspective,
in practice we care a lot about constants, and for this reason we
describe a slight change to the consensus mechanism that allows
us to achieve latency of 3 rounds under favorable network condi-
tions (which we expect to be the default) and still have worst-case
constant latency.
The key changes are to make the permutation (along which the
head is chosen) “a little" deterministic and to change the pattern of
initial deterministic common votes.
Permutation. Recall that in order to choose the head for round
r in Aleph rst a random permutation over units at this round pir
is commonly generated and then in the order determined by pir
the rst unit decided 1 is picked as the head. The issue is that
in order for the randomness to actually “trick" the adversary, and
not allow him to make the latency high, the permutation can be
revealed at earliest at round r + 4 in case of Aleph, and r + 5 in case
of ickAleph20. In particular the decision cannot be made earlier
than a round after the permutation is revealed. To improve upon
that in the optimistic case, we make the permutation pir partially
deterministic and allow to recover the rst entry of the permutation
already in round r . More specically, the mechanism of determining
pir is as follows:
• Generate pseudo-randomly an index i0 ∈ [N ] based on just
the round number r or on the head of round r − 1.
• Let τr be a random permutation constructed as previously
using SecretBits(·, r + 5).
• In pir as rst come all units created by node i0 in round
r (there might be multiple of them because of forking),
sorted by hashes, and then come all the remaining units of
round r in the order as determined by τr .
Such a design allows the nodes to learn i0 and hence the rst
candidate for the head right away in round r and thus (in case of
positive decision) choose it already in round r +3. The remainder of
the permutation is still random and cannot be manipulated by the
adversary, thus the theoretical guarantees on latency are preserved.
20The dierence stems from the potential existence of forks in ch-DAG constructed in
ickAleph and will become more clear after reading lemma C.11
For completeness we provide pseudocode for the new version of
GeneratePermutation. In the pseudocode DefaultIndex can be any
deterministic function that is computed from D after the decision
on round r − 1 has been made. Perhaps the simplest option is
DefaultIndex(r ,D) := 1+ (r mod N ). In practice we might want to
use some more complex strategy, which promotes nodes creating
units that spread fast; for instance, it could depend on the head
chosen for the (r − 1)-round.
GeneratePermutation(r ,D):
1 if R(D) < r + 3 then output ⊥
2 i0 ← DefaultIndex(r ,D)
3 (V1,V2, . . . ,Vl ) ← list of units created by Pi0 in round r sorted
by hashes
/* Typically l = 1, l > 1 can only happen if Pi0
forked in round r. */
4 for each unitU of round r in D do
5 i ← the creator of U
6 x ← SecretBits(i, r + 5,D)
7 if x = ⊥ then output (V1,V2, . . . ,Vl )
8 assign priority(U ) ← hash(x | |U ) ∈ {0, 1}λ
9 let (U1,U2, . . . ,Uk ) be the units in D of round r not created
by Pi0 sorted by priority(·)
10 output (V1,V2, . . . ,Vl ,U1,U2, . . . ,Uk )
Common Votes. In ickAleph we use a slightly modied se-
quence of initial deterministic common votes as compared to Aleph.
This change is rather technical but, roughly speaking, is geared
towards making the head decision as quickly as possible in the pro-
tocol. Here is a short summary of the new CommonVote scheme.
Let U0 be a unit created by i and r := R(U0), then for d = 2, 3, . . .
we dene
CommonVote(U0, r + d) :=

1 for d = 2
0 for d = 3
SecretBits(i, r + d + 1) for d > 4
Where in the last case we extract a single random bit from SecretBits,
as previously.
A.3 Reducing size of units
We note that encoding parents of a unit by a set of their hashes
is rather inecient as it takes roughly N · λ bits to store just this
information (λ bits per parent). Since the reasonable choices for
lambda in this setting are 256 or 512, this is a rather signicant
overhead. In this section we propose a solution that reduces this to
just a small constant number (i.e. around 2) of bits per parent.
Recall that in the absence of forks every unit is uniquely char-
acterized by its creator id and by round number. Since forking
is a protocol violation that is severely penalized (for instance, by
slashing the node’s stake), one should expect it to happen rarely if
at all. For this reason it makes sense to just use this simple encoding
of units: (i, r ) (meaning the unit created by i at round r ) and add
a simple fallback mechanism that detects forked parents. More
specically, the parents of a unit U are encoded as a combination
of the following two pieces of data
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(1) A list LU = [r1, r2, . . . , rN ] of length N that contains the
round numbers of parents of U corresponding to creators
1, 2, . . . ,N . In the typical situation the list has only a small
number of distinct elements, hence can be compressed to
just 2 or 3 bits per entry.
(2) The “control hash"
hU := h(h1 | |h2 | | . . . | |hN ),
where h1,h2, . . . ,hN are the hashes of parents of U .
Consequently, the above encoding requires O(N + λ) bits instead
of Ω(Nλ) bits as the original one. While such a construction does
not allow to identify forks straight away, it does allow to identify
inconsistencies. Indeed, if an honest node k receives a unit U from
node j, then it will read the parent rounds and check if all parent
units are already present in Dk . If not, then these units will be
requested from the sender of U , and failing to obtain them will
result in dropping the unit U by node k . In case k knows all parent
units, it may verify the control hash and if inconsistency is detected,
node k should request21 all parent units present in Dj from node
j. If node j is also honest, then node k will reveal a forking unit
among parents of U and issue an alert before adding U to Dk . On
the other hand, in case Pj does not provide parents ofU , Pk can
simply drop the unit U .
B ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOLS
CONSTRUCTING CH-DAGS
Within the paper, two possible protocols constructing ch-DAG
are considered, namely, DAG-Grow and ick-DAG-Grow. In this
section, we analyze these protocols in the context of desirable
properties as in denition 3.2.
B.1 DAG-Grow
We provide a proof of Theorem 3.1, i.e., we show that theDAG-Grow
protocol is reliable, ever-expanding, fork-free and advances the
DAG rounds at least as quickly as the asynchronous are progressing.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Reliable. Node Pi adds a unit U to its ch-DAG only if it is locally
output by ch-RBC. By the properties of ch-RBC we conclude that if
a unit is locally output for one honest node, it is eventually locally
output by every other honest node.
Ever-expanding. Assume the contrary, i.e., there exists r such
that no honest node Pi can gather 2f +1 units of round r inDi and
hence no node is able to produce a unit of round r + 1. Let r0 be the
minimum such r . We know that r0 > 0, since every honest node
participates in broadcasting of units of round 0 without waiting
for parents. The units of round r0 − 1 created by honest nodes are
eventually added to local copies of all honest nodes, hence at some
point, every honest node can create and broadcast a unit of round
r , which then is eventually included in all local copies of ch-DAG.
As there are 2f + 1 honest nodes, we arrive at a contradiction.
Fork-free. This is a direct consequence of the “reliability" of ch-
RBC, see Lemma F.1(Fast Agreement)
21The request should include signed hashes of all units from Dk that are indeed
parents of U to prevent k from sending false requests.
DAG rounds vs asynchronous rounds. By Lemma D.1 each
honest node produces at least one new unit each 5 async-rounds.
Since each new unit needs to have higher DAG-round, it concludes
the proof. 
B.2 ick-DAG-Grow
Since ick-DAG-Grow does not rely on reliable broadcast, it does
not enjoy all the good properties of the DAG-Grow protocol. Most
notably, it allows nodes to process forks and add forked units to
the ch-DAG. We prove that it is still reliable and ever-growing, and
additionally that the number of forks created by a single node is
bounded by N for each round, i.e., we prove Theorem A.1.
Proof of Theorem A.1.
Reliable. First, we observe that while the alert system may slow
the protocol down for some time, it may not cause it to stall in-
denitely. Indeed, each honest node needs to engage in at most N
alert RBC instances per each discovered forker, i.e., at most 13N
2
instances in total. Since an RBC instance started by an honest node
is guaranteed to terminate locally for each node, there is some
point in time of the protocol execution, name it T0, after which no
more alerts instantiated by honest nodes are active anymore. Con-
sequently, honest nodes can gossip their local copies of ch-DAG
after T0 without any obstacles. This means in particular that every
pair of honest nodes exchange their ch-DAG information innitely
often (with probability one), which implies reliability.
Ever-expanding. This follows from reliability as the set of honest
is large enough (2f + 1) to advance the rounds of the ch-DAG by
themselves. Indeed, by induction, for every round number r > 0
every honest node eventually receives at least 2f + 1 units created
by non-forkers (for instance honest nodes) in round r −1 and hence
can create a correct unit of round r by choosing these units as
parents.
Bounding number of forks. An honest node i adds a fork variant
to its local copy of ch-DAG only in one of the two scenarios:
• It was the rst version of that fork that i has received,
• Some other node has publicly committed to this version
via the alert system.
Since there are only N − 1 other nodes that could cause alerts, the
limit of maximum of N versions of a fork follows. 
C ANALYSIS OF CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS
The organization of this section is as follows: In Subsection C.1 we
analyze the consensus mechanism in the Aleph protocol. In partic-
ular we show that ChooseHead is consistent between nodes and
incurs only a constant number of rounds of delay in expectation.
This also implies that every unit (created by an honest node) waits
only a constant number of asynchronous rounds until it is added
to the total order, which is necessary in the proof of Theorem 2.1.
The Subsection C.2 is analogous but discusses ickAleph (intro-
duced in Section A) instead. Finally in Subsection C.3 we show an
optimistic bound of 3 rounds validation for ickAleph.
Since the proofs in Subsection C.2 are typically close adaptations
of these in Subsection C.1 we recommend the reader to start with
the latter. In the analysis of ickAleph we distinguish between
two cases: when the adversary attacks using forks, and when no
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forks have happened recently. In the former case the latency might
increase from expected O(1) to O(logN ) rounds, yet each time this
happens at least one of the nodes gets banned22 and thus it can
happen only f times during the whole execution of the protocol. We
do not attempt to optimize constants in this section, but focus only
on obtaining optimal asymptotic guarantees. A result of practical
importance is obtained in Subsection C.3 where we show that 3
rounds are enough in the "optimistic" case.
Throughout this section we assume that the SecretBits primitive
satises the properties stated in Denition 3.3. An implementation
of SecretBits is provided in Section 4.4.
C.1 Aleph
We would to prove that the expected number of rounds needed
for a unit to be ordered by the primitive OrderUnits is constant,
and that each honest node is bound to produce the same ordering.
To achieve this, rst we need a series of technical lemmas.
Lemma C.1 (Vote latency). Let X be a random variable which,
for a unit U0, indicates the number of rounds after which all units
vote unanimously on U0. Formally, let U0 be a unit of round r and
dene X = X (U0) to be the smallest l such that there exists σ ∈ {0, 1}
such that for every unit U of round r + l we have Vote(U0,U ) = σ .
Then for K ∈ N we have
P(X > K) 6 24−K .
Proof. Fix a unit U0. Let r ′ > r + 4 be a round number and let
Pk be the rst honest node to create a unit U of the round r ′. Let
σ denote a vote on U0 that was cast by at least f + 1 units in ↓(U ).
Then, every unit of round r ′ will have at least one parent that votes
σ . It is easy to check that if also σ = CommonVote(U0, r ′,Dk ),
then every unit of round r ′ is bound to vote σ .
By Denition 3.3 (1), the votes of units in ↓(U ) are indepen-
dent of CommonVote(U0, r ′,Dk ) since it uses SecretBits(i, r ′,Dk ).
Therefore, if at round r ′ − 1 voting was not unanimous, then with
probability at least 1/2 it will be unanimous starting from round r ′
onward. Since P(X > 5) 6 12 , we may calculate P(X > K) 6 2−K+4,
for K > 4 by induction, and observe that it is trivially true for
K = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Lemma C.2 (Decision latency). Let Y be a random variable that,
for a unit U0, indicates the number of rounds after which all honest
nodes decide onU0. Formally, letU0 be a unit of a round r and dene
Y = Y (U0) to be the smallest l such that there exists σ such that for
every honest node Pi if R(Di ) > r + l , then Decide(U0;Di ) = σ .
Then for K ∈ N,K > 0 we have
P(Y > K) 6 K
2K−5
= O
(
K · 2−K
)
.
Proof. First, we need to check that Y is well-dened, i.e. for
every U0 there is l ∈ N and there is σ such that for every honest
node Pi if R(Di ) > r + l , then Decide(U0;Di ) = σ .
We observe that if there is an honest node Pk and a unitU ∈ Dk
such that UnitDecide(U0,U ,Dk ) = σ , ⊥, then eventually for
every honest node Pi , we will have Decide(U0;Di ) = σ . Indeed,
x an honest node Pk and a unit U ∈ Dk of round r ′ > r + 4
22Banning forkers is implemented by adding one simple rule to the growing protocol:
never pick forking nodes as parents.
such that UnitDecide(U0,U ,Dk ) = σ , ⊥. Then, at least 2f + 1
units of round r ′ − 1 vote σ and CommonVote(U0, r ′) = σ . Now
by the denitions of UnitVote, we see that every other unitU ′ of
round r ′must have UnitVote(U0,U ′,Dk ) = σ , and thus by a simple
induction we get that, every unit of round greater than r ′ will also
vote σ on U0. Finally, by the denition of Decide we see that once
UnitDecide outputs a σ , ⊥, then the result of UnitVote is σ and
does not change with the growth of the local copy of ch-DAG.
By the above, if we prove that UnitDecide will always eventually
output non-⊥, then the denition of Y will be correct.
Let Y ′ = Y ′(U0) be dened as the smallest l such that for every
unit U of round r + l the function UnitDecide(U0,U) outputs σ .
If X (U0) = l , then either Y ′(U0) = l , or Y ′(U0) is the index of the
rst round after l at which CommonVote equals σ . The probablity
that at round r + l nodes vote unanimously σ for the rst time, but
then no CommonVote was equal to σ before round r + L equals
P(X = l)/2L−1−l , and thus we have:
P(Y ′ > L) 6
L−1∑
l=0
2−L+1+lP(X = l) + P(X > L)
=
L−1∑
l=0
2−L+1+lP(X = l) +
+∞∑
l=L
P(X = l)
= 2−LP(X > 0) +
L−1∑
l=0
2−L+lP(X > l)
6
L + 1
2L−4
SinceX is well-dened, then so isY ′ and we see that UnitDecide
eventually outputs a non-⊥. Moreover, observe that Y 6 Y ′ + 1.
Indeed, if every node of round r + l has decided σ , then the ch-DAG
of height > r + l + 1 includes at least one of the decisions, and we
can read the last required secret. Finally, Y 6 Y ′ + 1 implies
P(Y > K) 6 P(Y ′ > K − 1) 6 K
2K−5
.

The following lemma guarantees that at every level there are a
lot of units that are decided on 1.
Lemma C.3 (Fast positive decisions). Assume that an honest
node Pi has just created a unitU of round r + 3. At this point in the
protocol execution, there exists a setSr of at least 2f +1 units of round
r such that for everyU0 ∈ Sr , every honest node will eventually have
Decide(U0,Di ) = 1.
Proof. Let K be a set of 2f + 1 nodes that created units in ↓(U ).
Additionally, let T be the set of 2f + 1 units of round r + 1 created
by nodes in K . Every unit in ↓(U ) is above 2f + 1 units of round
r + 1, hence it is above at least f + 1 units in T (the remaining f
units may be created by nodes outside of K). By the pigeonhole
hole principle, there exists a unit U0 ∈ T such that at least f + 1
units in ↓(U ) are above it. Set Sr :=↓(U0).
Let V be a unit of round r + 3 and V ′ ∈↓(V ) be its parent that
is above U0 (which has to exist since every subset of 2f + 1 units
of round r + 2 must include at least one unit above U0). Since
CommonVote(Ur ,W ) equals 1 for allW of rounds r + 1, r + 2, r + 3,
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for Ur ∈ Sr we have Vote(Ur ,U0) = 1, hence Vote(Ur ,V ′) = 1, and
nally, Vote(Ur ,V ) = 1.
Thus, during all subsequent rounds Vote(Ur , ·) = 1 and Ur will
be decided 1 as soon as the next CommonVote equals 1. 
Intuitively, this lemma states that the set of potential heads that
will be eventually positively decided is large. Additionally, it is
dened relatively quickly, i.e., before the adversary sees the content
of any unit of round r + 3. Importantly, it is dened before the
permutation in which potential heads will be considered is revealed.
Note that it has some resemblance to the spread protocol dened
in [5].
In general, the above result cannot be improved, as the adversary
can always slow down f nodes, thus their units, unseen by others,
may not be considered “ready” to put in the linear order. Also, note
that this lemma does not require any common randomness, as the
votes in round r + 3 depend only on the structure of the ch-DAG.
Lemma C.4 (Fast negative decisions). LetU be a unit of round
r such that for some honest node i ,U < Di even though R(Di ) > r+4.
Then, for any local view D, Decide(U ,D) , 1.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that D is local view such that
Decide(U ,D) = 1. By denition of Decide, there has to be unit
V1 ∈ D such that UnitDecide(U ,V1,D) = 1. Let nowD ′ be a local
view such thatD,Di ⊆ D ′. Such D ′ is possible to construct since
all local views have to be compatible by point (2) of Theorem 3.1.
Let V0 be a unit of DAG-round R(Di ) + 4 in Di (and hence
in D ′). Since V0 can’t be above U , for every V ∈↓(V0) we have
Vote(U ,V ,Di ) = 0. Since | ↓(V0)| > 2f + 1, each unit of DAG-
round r + 4 in D ′ is above at least one unit in ↓(V0) and hence
votes either 0 or by CommonVote. But CommonVote forU always
equals 0 at DAG-round R(U ) + 4 by denition, and consequently,
each unit of DAG-round r + 4 has to Vote 0 for U . If all units votes
unanimously at any given DAG-round, such vote is passed over to
the next DAG-rounds contradicting the existence of V1 deciding 1,
what concludes the proof. 
Fact C.1. Let X1, . . . ,XM be random variables, K ∈ R. Then
P(max(X1, . . . ,XM ) > K) 6
M∑
m=1
P(Xm > K)
Proof. Simply observe that if max(X1, . . . ,XM ) > K , then for
at least onem ∈ [M] it must be Xm > K
{max(X1, . . . ,XM ) > K} ⊆
M⋃
m=1
{Xm > K}.

The next lemma shows the bound on the number of additional
rounds that are needed to choose a head.
Lemma C.5 (ChooseHead latency). The function ChooseHead
satises the following properties:
• Agreement. For every round r there is a uniquely chosen
head U , i.e., for every ch-DAG D maintained by an honest
node, ChooseHead(r ,D) ∈ {⊥,U }.
• Low latency. Let Zr be a random variable dened as the
smallest l such that for every local copyD of height r + l we
have ChooseHead(r ,D) , ⊥. Then for K ∈ N,K > 0 we
have P(Zr > K) = O
(
K · 2−K
)
Proof.
Agreement. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exist
two ch-DAGsDi andDj maintained by honest nodes i, j , such that
ChooseHead(r ,Di ) = U and ChooseHead(r ,Dj ) = U ′ for two
distinct units U ,U ′. Note that for this we necessarily have
R(Di ) > r + 4 and R(Dj ) > r + 4,
as otherwise GeneratePermutation(r , ·) would return ⊥.
Further, as necessarily Decide(U ,Di ) = 1 and Decide(U ′,Dj ) =
1, by Lemma C.4 we obtain that bothU and U ′ need to be present
in Di and Dj .
To conclude the argument it remains to observe that the priorities
computed by GeneratePermutation(r , ·) are consistent between
dierent ch-DAGs as they are computed deterministically based on
the common outcome of SecretBits. We thus arrive at the desired
contradiction: if, say, U has higher priority than U ′ then the jth
node should have choosen U instead of U ′.
Constant latency. Consider the set Sr from Lemma C.3. Let Pi
be a node, x = SecretBits(i, r + 4,Di ), and let
pir = (U1, . . . ,Uk ) = GeneratePermutation(r ,Di ).
The permutation given by priorities hash(x | |Ui ) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
is uniformly random by Denition 3.3 (1) and the assumption that
hash gives random bits in {0, 1}λ . Moreover, it is independent of
the set Sr , as this set is dened when the rst unit of round r + 3 is
created and pir was unknown before it.
Let Sr denote a random variable dened as the smallest index
s such that s-th element of the permutation pir is in Sr . Since the
permutation is uniformly random and independent of Sr , then for
s = 1, . . . , f + 1 we have
P(Sr = s) = 2f + 13f + 2 − s
s−1∏
j=1
f + 1 − j
3f + 2 − j ,
and P(Sr > f + 1) = 0, hence for s = 1, . . . ,k , we have
P(Sr = s) 6 3−s+1.
By Lemma C.3, all units from Sr must be decided 1, then to
calculate ChooseHead(r ,Di ) we need to wait for decisions on at
most Sr units of round r . Using Fact C.1 for random variables from
Lemma C.2 we see that for K > 4
P(Zr > K | Sr = s) 6
k∑
s=1
P(Y (Us ) > K) 6 s · K2K−5 ,
therefore
P(Zr > K) 6
N∑
s=1
P(Sr = s)P(Zr > K | Sr = s) = O
(
K · 2−K
)
.

We end this section with a theorem that shows how long does it
take to append a head to the linear order.
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Theorem C.6 (OrderUnits latency). LetWr be a random vari-
able that indicates number of rounds required to append a head of
round r to the linear order. Formally,Wr is dened as the smallest l
such that for every local copy Di of height r + l we have
ChooseHead(r ,Di ) ∈ OrderUnits(Di ).
Then
E(Wr ) = O(1)
.
Proof. The rst part of the proof will show that for all K ∈
N,K > 0 we have
P(Wr > K) = O
(
K · 2−K
)
.
Let Pi be a node. ChooseHead(r ,Di ) ∈ OrderUnits(Di ) implies
that for all j = 0, 1, . . . , r we have
ChooseHead(j,Di ) , ⊥.
Therefore, ifWr > K , then for at least one round j we have Z j >
K + r − j, where Z j is a random variable from Lemma C.5. Since
(Wr > K) ⊆
r⋃
j=0
(Z j > K + r − j),
then
P(Wr > K) 6
r∑
j=0
P(Z j > K + r − j) 6 O(1)
r∑
j=0
K + j
2K+j
= O(1)
K+r∑
j=K
j
2j
6 O(1)
+∞∑
j=K
j
2j
= O
(
K · 2−K
)
.
SinceWr has values in N, then
E(Wr ) =
+∞∑
K=1
P(Wr > K),
and nally we have
E(Zr ) =
+∞∑
K=1
P(Zr > K) = O(1)
+∞∑
K=1
K
2K
= O(1).

C.2 ickAleph
In this section we analyze the ickAleph consensus mechanism.
The main dierence when compared to Aleph is that now we allow
the adversary to create forks. Below, we introduce two denitions
that allow us to capture forking situations in the ch-DAG so that we
can prove how the latency of the protocol behaves in their presence.
At the end of this subsection we also show that these situations are
rare and can happen only O(N ) times.
Definition C.1. Let r be a round number. We say that a unitU
of round r + 4 is a fork witness if it is above at least two variants of
the same unit of round r or r + 1.
Definition C.2. LetU be a set of all 2f + 1 units of round r + 4
created by honest nodes. We say that the r th round of the ch-DAG is
publicly forked, if there are at least f + 1 fork witnesses among units
U.
We proceed with the analysis of the latency of ickAleph starting
again by determining the delay in rounds until all nodes start to
vote unanimously.
Lemma C.7 (Vote latency [forickAleph]). Let X be a ran-
dom variable that for a unitU0 represents the number of rounds after
which all units unanimously vote onU0. Formally, letU0 be a unit of
round r and dene X = X (U0) to be the smallest l such that for some
σ ∈ {0, 1}, for every unitU of round r + l we have Vote(U0,U ) = σ .
Then for K ∈ N we have
P(X > K) 6
(
3
4
)(K−6)/2
.
Proof. Fix a unit U0. Let r ′ > r + 5 be an odd round number
and let Pk be the rst honest node to create a unitU of round r ′.
Let σ denote a vote such that there is no unitV ∈↓(U ) for which
every unit in ↓(V ) votes σ on U0. The value of σ is well-dened,
i.e., at least one value from {0, 1} satises this property (pick σ = 0
if both 0 and 1 satisfy the above property). Indeed, every two units
V ,V ′ ∈↓(U ) have at least one parent unit in common, thus it is not
possible that every unit in ↓(V ) votes σ , and every unit in ↓(V ′)
votes 1 − σ .
Recall that the adversary cannot predict CommonVote(U0, r ′−1)
or CommonVote(U0, r ′) before U is created. Now, if
CommonVote(U0, r ′− 1,Dk ) = CommonVote(U0, r ′,Dk ) = 1−σ ,
then every unit in ↓(U ) votes 1 − σ onU0, and so doesU . If some
other unitU ′ of round r ′ were to vote σ onU0, then it would mean
that at least 2f + 1 units in ↓(U ′) vote σ on U0, which is necessary
to overcome the r ′-round common vote. But this is impossible,
as this set of 2f + 1 units must include at least one unit from
↓(U ). Therefore, if at round r ′ − 2 voting was not unanimous, then
with probability at least 1/4 it will be unanimous starting from
round r ′ onward. Hence, we may check P(X > K) 6
(
3
4
)(K−6)/2
,
for K > 5 by induction, and observe that it is trivially true for
K = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
Here we obtain a slightly worse bound than in the corresponding
Lemma C.1 for the Aleph protocol. The main reason for that is that
the property that unitsU andU ′ have at least f +1 common parent
units does not longer hold, as now up to f of them may be forked.
One can try to improve this result by introducing dierent voting
rules, and analyzing forked and non-forked cases separately, but
this would only make the argument cumbersome, and would not
help to decrease the asymptotic latency in the asynchronous case,
nor the numerical latency in the partially synchronous case.
Lemma C.8 (Decision latency [forickAleph]). Let Y be a
random variable that for a unit U0 indicates the number of rounds
after which all honest nodes decide on U0. Formally, let U0 be a unit
of a round r and dene Y = Y (U0) to be the smallest l such that there
exists σ such that for every honest node Pi if R(Di ) > r + l , then
Decide(U0;Di ) = σ . Then for K ∈ N we have
P(Y > K) = O
(
K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
.
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Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma C.2. First, we
show that Y is well-dened. The argument is exactly the same,
not aected by introducing forks. If at least one unit decides a
non-⊥ value σ , then every unit of equal or higher round votes σ ,
and eventually there will be a round with common vote equal to σ ,
which will trigger the decision among all nodes.
We dene Y ′ = Y ′(U0) as in the proof of Lemma C.2 and obtain
P(Y ′ > L) 6 2−LP(X > 0) +
L−1∑
l=0
2−L+lP(X > l)
6 (L + 1)
(
3
4
)(L−6)/2
The nal dierence is that now Y 6 Y ′ + 2, because we need
one additional round to read the value of the last required secret:
P(Y > K) 6 P(Y ′ > K − 2) 6 (K − 1)
(
3
4
)(K−8)/2
.

Similarly as for Aleph, for O(1) latency it is crucial to show that a
large set of units of round r is guaranteed to be decided positively.
Lemma C.9 (Fast positive decisions [for ickAleph]). Let
r > 0 be a round number. Assume that an honest node Pi has created
a unit U of round r + 4. There exists at least one unitU0 of round r
such that Decide(U0,Di ) = 1. If additionallyU is not a fork witness,
then there exists a set Si,r of at least 1.5f + 1 units of round r such
that for everyU0 ∈ Si,r we have Decide(U0,Di ) = 1.
Proof. For convenience, denote by Ur ′ the set of all units of
round r ′ below U .
Let us rst observe that whenever for a unitU0 every unit V ∈
Ur+2 votes 1 on U0, then it is decided 1 by U , i.e.,
(∀ V ∈ Ur+2 Vote(U0,V ) = 1) ⇒ UnitDecide(U0,U ) = 1,
This can be seen as follows:
• every unitW ∈ Ur+3 votes 1, i.e., Vote(U0,W ) = 1 because
↓(W ) unanimously vote 1,
• since the common vote at round r +4 is 1 and all round-(r +
3) parents ofU unanimously vote 1, UnitDecide(U0,U ) =
1.
The remaining part of the proof is to show that in the general case
there is at least one unit U0 ∈ Ur that is voted 1 by every unit in
Ur+2 and that there is at least 1.5f + 1 such units in the case when
U is not a forking witness.
For the rst part, note that every unitW of round r + 1 has at
least f + 1 honest parents at round r , thus by reverse counting
there exists a unit U0 or round r , created by an honest node that is
a parent of at least f + 1 honest units at round r + 1. Note that U0
is as desired, i.e., every unitV of round r + 2 votes 1 forU0 because
at least one honest unitW ∈↓(V ) is aboveU0.
For the second part, suppose that U is not a fork witness, in
which case the setsUr andUr+1 contain no forks and hence if we
denote
a := N − |Ur |,
b := N − |Ur+1 |,
then 0 6 a,b 6 f . We dene the set Si,r to be all units U0 ∈ Ur
that are parents of at least f − b + 1 units fromUr+1.
Suppose now that U0 is such a unit, we show that all units in
Ur+2 vote 1 on U0. Indeed, take any V ∈ Ur+2. Since V has at
least 2f + 1 parents inUr+1, at least one of them is aboveU0 (by
denition of Si,r ) and thus ↓(V ) does not unanimously vote on 0.
The default vote at round r + 2 is 1 therefore V has to vote 1 onU0,
as desired.
Finally, it remains to show that Si,r is large. For brevity denote
the number of elements in Si,r by x . We start by observing that
the number of edges connecting units fromUr andUr+1 is greater
or equal than
(2f + 1) · |Ur+1 | = (2f + 1) · (N − b).
On the other hand, we can obtain an upper bound on the number of
such edges by assuming that each unit from Si,r has the maximum
number of N − b incoming edges and each unit fromUr \ Si,r has
the maximum number of f − b incoming edges, thus:
x · (N − b) + (N − a − x)(f − b) > (2f + 1)(N − b),
which after simple rearrangements leads to
x > 2f + 1 − (f − a)(f − b)2f + 1 .
Since 0 6 a,b 6 f we obtain
x > 1.5f + 1.

It is instructive to compare Lemma C.9 regarding ickAleph
to Lemma C.3 regarding Aleph. Note that in the non-forked case
every unit from the setUr+2 has at least 2f + 1 parents in the set
Ur+1, and by pigeonhole principle must be above all units from
Si,r . Therefore, we decrease the number of rounds after which
units from Si,r become “popular” from 3 to 2. This is achieved
at the cost of reducing the size of this set by 0.5f units, but is
necessary to speed up the protocol in the optimistic case.
Lemma C.10 (Fast negative decisions [forickAleph]). Let
r > 0 be a round number. LetU be a unit of round r+3, andU0  U be
a unit of round r . Then, for any local viewD 3 U0 with R(D) > r +5
we have Decide(U0,D) = 0.
Proof. LetU ′ be any unit of round r +3. ThenU ′ votes 0 onU0.
Indeed, ifU ′ were to vote 1, then there would be at least 2f +1 units
in ↓(U ′) above U0, and therefore at least one unit in ↓(U ) above U0,
but this would implyU > U0. Hence, every unit of round greater
or equal to r + 3 votes 0 onU0, and nally every unit of round r + 5
decides 0 on U0 due to the common vote being equal to 0. 
In ickAleph the latency of choosing head can dier depending
on whether we are in the forking situation or not. The following
lemma states this formally.
Lemma C.11 (ChooseHead latency [for ickAleph]). The
function ChooseHead satises the following properties:
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• Agreement. For every round r there is a uniquely chosen
head U , i.e., for every ch-DAG D maintained by an honest
node, ChooseHead(r ,D) ∈ {⊥,U }.
• Low latency. Let Zr be a random variable dened as the
smallest l such that for every local copyD of height r + l we
have ChooseHead(r ,D) , ⊥. Then for K ∈ N we have
P(Zr > K) = O
(
K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
if the protocol is locally non-forked at round r , and
P(Zr > K) = O
(
N 2 · K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
otherwise.
Proof. Agreement. Similarly as in the corresponding part of
the proof of Lemma C.5 we observe that the permutation (computed
by dierent nodes) along which the head at a given round is chosen
is consistent in the sense that: if two nodes both hold a pair of units
U0,U1 of round r then these units will end up obtaining the same
priorities at both nodes and thus will be placed in the same relative
order in the permutation.
Consequently all we need to show is that at the time when an
honest node i decides a unit U as the head of round r then every
unit U ′ that is not part of its local copy Di will be decided 0. This
indeed follows from Lemma C.10 since for ChooseHead(r ,Di ) to
not be ⊥ the ch-DAG Di needs to have R(Di ) > r + 3.
Low latency. The proof of the non-forked case diers from the
proof of Lemma C.5 in two ways. Firstly, the set of units that will
eventually be decided 1 is smaller, but still has size Ω(N ). Secondly,
the rst unit in the permutation is known in advance. Here we
prove a slightly stronger result, namely we assume that the rst
c > 0 units are known, where c should be thought of as a small
constant (independent of N ). For concreteness one can simply think
of c = 1.
Let r > 0 be a round number. Let U be the rst (r + 5)-round
unit created by an honest node. If the protocol is locally non-forked
at round r , then there are at least f + 1 (r + 4)-round units that are
not fork witnesses, hence there is at least one unitV ∈↓(U ), created
by node i , that is not a fork witness.
LetUr denote all round-r units below V , and consider the set
Si,r ⊆ Ur from Lemma C.9. The setUr has at mostN elements and
contains no forks. From Lemma C.10 we know that all round-r units
not inUr (possibly including some forks of units fromUr ) are de-
cided 0 by every node at round r+5. Therefore, we can only consider
units from Ur when calculating GeneratePermutation(r ). Note
that the unit priorities are independent from sets Si,r ,Ur , because
the unit V exists before the adversary can read SecretBits(·, r + 5)
using shares from the unit U .
Let si,r denote a random variable dened as the smallest index s
such that s-th element of the permutation on unitsUr is in Si,r ,
excluding the rst c default indices (in other words, P(si,r 6 c) = 0).
The permutation is uniformly random and independent of Si,r .
Since we want to calculate an upper bound on the probability
distribution of si,r , then we might assume w.l.o.g. that the setUr
has exactly 3f +1−c elements, and that the set Si,r has 1.5f +1−c ,
in both cases excluding units created by the c default nodes.
Then, for s = 1, . . . , 1.5f + 1 we have
P(si,r = s) = 1.5f + 1 − c3f + 2 − c − s
s−1∏
j=1
1.5f + 1 − j
3f + 2 − c − j ,
and P(si,r > 1.5f + 1) = 0, hence for s = 1, 2, . . . we have
P(si,r = s) 6 2−s+c .
By Lemma C.9, all units from Si,r must be decided 1, then to
calculate ChooseHead(r ,Di ) we need to wait for decisions on at
most si,r + c units of round r (here we include the default indices
with highest priority). Using Fact C.1 for random variables from
Lemma C.8 we see that for K > 5
P(Zr > K | Sr = s) 6
s+c∑
k=1
P(Y (Uk ) > K)
6 (s + c)(K − 1)
(
3
4
)(K−8)/2
,
therefore
P(Zr > K) 6
N∑
s=1
P(Sr = s)P(Zr > K | Sr = s)
= O
(
K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
.
On the other hand, if the round is publicly forked, then we observe
that we need to wait for decision about at most N 2 units of round r
(since every unit can be forked at most N times), and use Fact C.1.

Theorem C.12 (OrderUnits latency [forickAleph]). Let
Wr be a random variable representing the number of rounds required
to append a head of round r to the linear order, assuming that the
default indices for rounds 0, . . . , r are known. Formally,Wr is dened
as the smallest l such that for every local copy Di of height r + l we
have
ChooseHead(r ,Di ) ∈ OrderUnits(Di ).
Then
E(Wr ) = O(1)
if the
4
log 43
logN rounds prior to r are not publicly forked, and
E(Wr ) = O(logN )
otherwise.
Proof. LetPi be a node. ChooseHead(r ,Di ) ∈ OrderUnits(Di )
is equivalent to the statement that for j = 0, 1, . . . , r we have
ChooseHead(j,Di ) , ⊥.
Therefore, ifWr > K , then for at least one round j we have Z j >
K + r − j, where Z j is a random variable from Lemma C.11.
We start with the forked variant. Since
(Wr > K) ⊆
r⋃
j=0
(Z j > K + r − j),
then
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P(Wr > K) 6
r∑
j=0
P(Z j > K + r − j)
6 O(1) · N 2
r∑
j=0
(K + j)
(
3
4
)(K+j)/2
= O(1) · N 2
K+r∑
j=K
j
(
3
4
) j/2
6 O(1) · N 2
+∞∑
j=K
j
(
3
4
) j/2
= O
(
N 2 · K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
.
Note that above we used the fact that the constant hidden under
the big O notation is independent of the round number.
Observe now that for K > 4
log 43
logN
P(Wr > K − 4 log 34 logN ) = O
(
K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
,
and sinceWr has values in N, then
E(Wr ) =
+∞∑
K=1
P(Wr > K) = O (logN ) .
To analyze the non-forked case we make a very similar argument,
but we use the tighter bound for the last 4
log 43
logN rounds. Denote
A := 4
log 43
logN for brevity.
P(Wr > K) 6
r∑
j=0
P(Z j > K + r − j)
6 O(1) · ©­«N 2
r−A∑
j=0
(K + j)
(
3
4
)(K+j)/2
+
r∑
j=r−A+1
(K + j)
(
3
4
)(K+j)/2ª®¬
6 O(1) · ©­«
r∑
j=A
(K + j)
(
3
4
)(K+j)/2
+
r∑
j=r−A+1
(K + j)
(
3
4
)(K+j)/2ª®¬
6 O(1) ·
r∑
j=0
(K + j)
(
3
4
)(K+j)/2
= O(1) ·
K+r∑
j=K
j
(
3
4
) j/2
6 O(1) ·
+∞∑
j=K
j
(
3
4
) j/2
= O
(
K ·
(
3
4
)K/2)
,
and therefore
E(Wr ) =
+∞∑
K=1
P(Wr > K) = O (1) .

Bounding the number of forked rounds. For completeness we
prove that there can be only a small, nite number of publicly
forked rounds for which the latency could be O(logN ), and for
the remaining rounds (the default case) the latency is O(1) as in
Lemma C.11.
Note that according to the Denition C.2, when a dishonest node
creates a single fork and shows it to one (or a small number) of
honest nodes, this does not yet make the corresponding round pub-
licly forked. Indeed, to increase the protocol latency the adversary
must show the fork to the majority of honest nodes, and it must
happen during the next 4 rounds. This denition captures a certain
trade-o inherent in all possible forking strategies, namely if the
attack is to increase the protocol latency, it cannot stay hidden from
the honest parties.
Definition C.3. We say that node i is a discovered forker, if
there are two variants of the same unit U ,U ′ created by i , and there
is a round r , such that every round-r unit is aboveU andU ′.
Being a discovered forker has two straightforward consequences.
First, no unit of round r or higher can connect directly to units
created by the forker, hence the node i is eectively banned from
creating units of round higher than r − 2. Moreover, the round-r
head unit is also above the fork, and thus we can easily introduce
some consensus-based mechanisms of punishing the forker.
Lemma C.13. Let r > 0 be a round number. Among all 2f + 1
round-r units created by honest nodes there is at least one unit U0
such that at least f + 1 units of round r + 1 created by honest nodes
are aboveU0, and every unit of round r + 2 (ever created) is aboveU0.
Proof. Recall that units created by honest nodes cannot be
forked. Every honest unit of round r + 1 has at least 2f + 1 parents
created by distinct nodes, hence it has at least f + 1 parents created
by honest nodes. By the pigeonhole principle, there exists at least
one round-r unit U0, created by an honest node, such that it is a
parent of at least f + 1 units of round r + 1 created by honest nodes
(denote these units byU). Now, every unit U of round r + 2 has at
least 2f + 1 parents created by distinct nodes, hence must have at
least one parent inU, which implies U > U0. 
Lemma C.14. Whenever a a round is publicly forked then during
the next 7 rounds at least one forker is discovered. Consequently,
if f ′ denotes the total number of discovered forkers then at most
7f ′ = O(N ) rounds of the protocol can be publicly forked.
Proof. LetU0 be the round-(r+5) unit whose existence is proved
in Lemma C.13. ThenU0 is above at least one of f +1 fork witnesses,
and therefore every unit of round r + 7 is above a fork created by
some node i (of course, this could happen earlier). Since no unit
of round r + 7 or higher can connect directly to units created by i ,
then no unit of round higher than r + 5 created by node i can be
present in the ch-DAG. Indeed, every such unit must have children
to be added to the local copy held by nodes other than i , and those
children units would be invalid. Therefore the node i can create
forks at six rounds, from r to r + 5, and these rounds can possibly
be publicly forked, hence the 6f ′ upper bound. Note that node i
could have forked at some publicly forked rounds with number
less than r , but then some other malicious node must have been
discovered. 
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C.3 ickAleph– The Optimistic Case
Here, we conduct an analysis of the ickAleph protocol behavior
in a partially synchronous scenario. It shows that the protocol
apart from being capable of operating with constant latency in an
asynchronous environment (as proved in the previous subsection),
but also matches the validation time achieved by state-of-the-art
synchronous protocols.
Since the protocol itself does not operate on the network layer,
but on ch-DAG, for sake of this subsection we need to translate
partial synchrony to the language of ch-DAGs.
Definition C.4. A ch-DAG is synchronous at round r if every
unit of round r produced by an honest node has units of round r − 1
produced by all honest nodes as its parents.
Note that in case of synchronous network the above condition
can be enforced by restricting each honest node to wait ∆ before
producing the next unit. Since the protocol is secure even with no
synchrony assumptions, the delay ∆ can be adaptively adjusted
to cope with partial synchrony in a similar manner as, say, in
Tendermint.
Theorem C.15. If D is a ch-DAG that is synchronous in rounds
r + 1 and r + 2 and DefaultIndex(r ,D) is honest, then any unit of
round r + 3 is enough to compute the head at round r .
Proof. Let i be the DefaultIndex at round r and U be the unit
created by Pi at round r . Since the ch-DAG is synchronous at
round r + 1, all honest nodes create a unit that is aboveU and thus
vote 1 on U . Further, again by synchrony, each unit V of round
r + 2 created by an honest node is above at least 2f + 1 units that
are aboveU , hence V "sees" 2f + 1 votes on 1 for U and since the
common vote at this round is 1 we can conclude that
UnitDecide(U ,V ,D) = 1.
Finally, at round r + 3 the unit U is returned as the rst proposal
for the head by the GeneratePermutation function23 and thus
ChooseHead(r ,D) = U .

D TRANSACTION ARRIVAL MODEL AND A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1
We are interested in the strongest possible form of protocol latency,
i.e., not only measuring time between the moment a transaction
is placed in a unit and the moment when it is commonly output
as a part of total ordering but instead to start the “timer" already
when the transaction is input to a node. For this, we introduce the
following model.
Transaction arrival model. We assume that nodes continuously
receive transactions as input and store them in their unbounded
buers. We make the following assumption regarding the buer
sizes:
23It may seem that the decision could have been made at round r + 2 already. Such
an “optimization" though breaks safety of the protocol in case of a malicious proposer.
Indeed, if the proposer forks the proposed unit, some node can decide it as head in
round r + 2, while another node could miss this variant and instead decide a dierent
variant on 1 later during the protocol execution. This cannot happen at round 3 by
Lemma C.4
Definition D.1 (Uniform buffer distribution). The ratio
between buer sizes of two honest nodes at the time of creation of
their respective units of a given DAG-round is bounded by a constant
CB > 1.
While it may look as a limiting assumption, it is not hard to ensure
it in a real-life scenario by requiring each transaction to be sent
to a randomly chosen set of nodes. An adversary could violate
this assumption by inputting many transactions to the system in a
skewed manner (i.e., sending them only to several chosen nodes),
but such attack would be expensive to conduct (since usually a
small fee is paid for each transaction) and hence each node with
such articially inated buer could be considered Byzantine.
Including transactions in units. Assuming such a model, each
honest node randomly samples 1N transactions from its buer to
be included in each new unit. Additionally, it removes transactions
that are already included in units of its local copy of ch-DAG from
its buer.
DAG-rounds and async-rounds. There are two dierent notions
of a “round” used throughout the paper – DAG-round as dened in
Section 3.1 and async-round, as dened by [19] and in Section G.
While the DAG-round is more commonly used in the paper, it
should be thought as a structural property of ch-DAGs and hence
not necessarily a measure of passing time. Hence, to be in line
with the literature, all proofs regarding latency are conducted in
terms of async-rounds. The following lemma provides a useful one-
sided estimate of unit production speed in terms of async-rounds,
roughly it says that DAG-rounds (asymptotically) progress at least
as quickly as async-rounds.
Lemma D.1. Each honest node initializes ch-RBC for a newly pro-
duced unit at least once during each 5 consecutive async-rounds.
Proof. Let Pi be an honest node. We prove that if Pi have
instantiated ch-RBC for unit of DAG-round rd at async-round ra
then it necessarily instantiates it again (for a dierent unit) before
async-round ra + 5 ends. We show it by induction on rd .
If rd = 1, then necessarily ra = 1 since every node is required to
produce a unit in its rst atomic step. Then, by Lemma F.1(Latency),
Pi will have at least 2f + 1 units of DAG-round 1 in its local copy
of ch-DAG by the end of async-round 4 and hence will be required
to instantiate ch-RBC at that time, what concludes the proof in this
case.
Now assume rd > 1. To produce a unit of DAG-round rd , there
must have been at least 2f + 1 units of DAG-round rd − 1 in Di .
Then at least 2f + 1 instances of ch-RBC for units of that DAG-
round have had to locally terminate for Pi before ra . Hence, by
Lemma F.1(Fast Agreement), we get that every honest node needs
to have at least 2f + 1 units of DAG-round rd − 1 in its local copy of
ch-DAG before async-round ra+2 ends. Consequently, each honest
node is bound to instantiate ch-RBC for its unit of DAG-round rd or
higher before async-round ra + 2 ends. We consider the following
two cases.
Case 1. Every honest node has instantiated ch-RBC for a unit of
DAG-round rd before async-round ra+2 ended. Then, every honest
node (including Pi ) will locally output the result of this ch-RBC
instances before DAG-round rd + 5 ends, by Lemma F.1(Latency).
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Hence, Pi is bound to instantiate ch-RBC for a unit of DAG-round
at least rd + 1 before async-round ra + 5 ends.
Case 2. If Case 1 does not hold, then by the above, at least one honest
node has instantiated ch-RBC for a unit of DAG-round r ′d > rd
before async-round ra+2 ended. Then, again using Lemma F.1(Fast
Agreement), we conclude that every honest node (including Pi )
needs to hold at least 2f + 1 units of DAG-round r ′d − 1 > rd before
async-round ra + 4 ends. Then Pi is bound to instantiate ch-RBC
for a unit of DAG-round at least rd + 1 before async-round ra + 4
ends.

Next, we formulate a lemma connecting the concept of async-round
and the transaction arrival model described on the beginning of
this section.
Lemma D.2. If a transaction tx is input to at least k honest nodes
during async-round ra then it is placed in an honest unit in async-
round ra +O(Nk ).
Proof. By Lemma D.1 each of the k honest nodes with tx in
buer is bound to produce at least one unit per 5 async-rounds.
Since the honest nodes are sampling transactions to be input to
units independently, the probability of tx being input to at least
one unit during any quintuple of async-rounds after ra is at least
1 −
(
1 − 1
N
)k
> 1 −
(
1 − k
N
+
k2
2N 2
)
=
k
N
− k
2
2N 2
>
k
2N ,
by extended Bernoulli’s inequality, since kN 6 1.
Hence the expected number of async-rounds before tx is in-
cluded in a unit is O(Nk ).

We now proceed to proving two technical lemmas that are required
to show that, on average, every transaction input to the system is
placed in a unit only a small (constant) number of times. We begin
with a simple probability bound that is then used in the second
lemma.
Lemma D.3. Let n,m ∈ N and suppose that Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn are
nite sets with |Qi | > m for every i = 1, 2, . . . ,n. For every i =
1, 2, . . . ,n dene a random variable Si ⊆ Qi that is obtained by in-
cluding independently at random each element ofQi with probability
1
n . Ifm > 48n then
P
(
min
T ⊆[n], |T |=n/3
⋃
i ∈T
Si
 6 m6
)
6 e−n .
Proof. For convenience denote Q =
⋃
i ∈[n]Qi . Let us x any
subset T ⊆ [n] of size n/3 and denote ST = ⋃i ∈T Si . For every
element q ∈ Q dene a random variable Yq ∈ {0, 1} that is equal to
1 if q ∈ ST and 0 otherwise. Under this notation, we haveST  = ∑
q∈Q
Yq .
We will apply Cherno Bound to upper bound the probability of∑
q∈Q
Yq 6
m
6 .
For this, note rst that {Yq }q∈Q are independent. Moreover, we
have E
[∑
q∈Q Yq
]
> m3 from linearity of expectation. Hence from
the Cherno Bound we derive
P
(ST  6 m6 ) = P ©­«
∑
q∈Q
Yq 6
m
6
ª®¬ 6 e−
m
24 6 e−2n .
Finally, by taking a union bound over all (at most 2n many) sets T
of size n/3 we obtain
P
(
min
T ⊆[n], |T |=n/3
ST  6 m6 ) 6 2n · e−2n = e−n .

Lemma D.4. Let TR be the number of, not necessarily dierent,
transactions (i.e., counted with repetitions) input to units during the
rst R = poly(N ) rounds of the protocol, and T ′R be the number of
pairwise dierent transactions in these units, then TR = O(T ′R + RN )
except with probability e−Ω(N ).
Proof. For every round r denote by Br the common (up to a
constant) size of this round’s buer of any honest node. Since every
unit contains at most O (Br/N ) transactions in round r , we have
that the total number of transactions input in units this round is
O(Br ) and thus TR = O
(∑R
r=0 Br
)
.
From Lemma E.2 at every round r , there exists a set Sr of units
at round r such that every unit of round at least r + 3 is above every
unit in Sr . Let alsoHr ⊆ Sr be any subset of at least f + 1 honest
units and Tr be the set of all transactions inHr . Since for any r1, r2
such that r2 > r1 + 3 we have Hr1 > Hr2 and thus Tr1 ∩ Tr2 = ∅.
In particular
T ′R >
 R⋃
r=0
Tr
 > 13 R∑
r=0
|Tr | .
From Lemma D.3 we obtain that unless Br < 48N it holds that
|Tr | > Br6 with probability 1 − e−N . Thus nally, we obtain that
with high probability (no matter how large Br is) |Tr | > Br6 − 8N ,
and consequently
T ′R >
1
3
R∑
r=0
|Tr | > 118
R∑
r=0
Br − 83RN ,
and therefore
TR = O
( R∑
r=0
Br
)
= O(T ′R + RN ).

Proof of Theorem 2.1.
Total Order and Agreement. It is enough to show that all the
honest nodes produce a common total order of units in ch-DAG.
Indeed, the transactions within units can be ordered in an ar-
bitrary yet deterministic way, and then a consistent total order
of units trivially yields a consistent total order of transactions.
The total order is deterministically computed based on the func-
tion ChooseHead applied to every round, which is consistent by
Lemma C.5(Agreement).
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Censorship Resilience and Latency. By Lemma D.2 we obtain
that each transaction input to k honest nodes is placed in a unit U
created by some honest node Pi after O(N/k) async-rounds.
By Lemma F.1(Latency) each honest node receivesU via ch-RBC
within 3 async-rounds from its creation and hence will append it
as a parent of its next unit, which will be created within 5 async-
rounds by Lemma D.1 and added to ch-DAGs of all honest nodes
within next 3 async-rounds, again by Lemma F.1(Latency). Thus,
after O(Nk ), the unit U containing tx is below all maximal units
created by honest nodes. Denote by rd the maximum DAG− round
over all honest nodes at that moment and by ra the currenct async-
round.
Since each unit has at least 2f + 1 parents, it follows that every
unit of round rd + 1 (even created by an dishonest node) is above
U . For this reason, the head of round rd + 1 is also above U and
in particular the unit U is ordered at latest by the time when the
head of this round is chosen. Note that by Lemma C.5(latency),
the head at round rd + 1 is determined after onlyO(1) DAG-rounds.
Combining this fact with Lemma D.1 it follows that after 5 ·O(1)
async-round each honest node can determine the head from its
version of the poset. We obtain that the total latency is bounded by
O(N/k) +O(1) ·O(1) = O(N/k).
Communication Complexity. Let tr be the number of trans-
actions that have been included in honest units at level r . By
Lemma F.1(Communication Complexity) we obtain that the to-
tal communication complexity utilized by instances of ch-RBC over
any sequence of R DAG-rounds is
O
(
N
R∑
r=1
tr + RN
2 logN
)
= O(TR + RN 2 logN ),
where TR is the total number of transactions included in units
at all rounds r = 0, 1, . . . ,R. From Lemma D.4 we conclude that
TR = O(T ′R + RN ) where T ′R is the number of distinct transactions
in these units. The nal bound on communication complexity is
O(T ′R + RN 2 logN ).

E RANDOMNESS BEACON
The main goals of this section are to show that ABFT-Beacon im-
plements a Randomness Beacon (thus providing a proof of The-
orem 2.2), and to prove correctness of two implementations of
SecretBits that are provided in Section 4, i.e., prove Lemma 4.1 and
Lemma 4.2.
Let us now briey summarize what is already clear and what is
left to prove regarding the randomness beacon.
(1) Every node Pi reliably broadcasts its key box KBi (in
U [i; 0]) that contains a commitment to a polynomial Ai (of
degree at most f ) and encrypted tossing keys for all the
nodes. Some of the tossing keys might be incorrect if Pi is
dishonest.
(2) For every i ∈ [N ] the unit U [i; 6] denes a set Ti ⊆ [N ]
and the ith MultiCoin is dened as a a threshold signature
scheme as if it were generated using the polynomial
Bi (x) =
∑
j ∈Ti
Aj (x).
(3) A threshold signature with respect toMutliCoini , i.e.,mBi (0)
for some m ∈ G can be generated by simply multiplying
together the threshold signaturesmAj (0) for j ∈ Ti .
(4) Thus, on a high level, what remains to prove is that:
• For every i ∈ [N ] such that U [i; 6] is available, it is
possible for the nodes to commonly generate thresh-
old signatures with respect to key set KSj for every
j ∈ Ti .
• For every i ∈ [N ] the key Bi (0) remains secret, or
more precisely, the adversary cannot forge signatures
mBi (0) for a randomly chosenm ∈ G.
Below, we proceed to formalizing and proving these properties.
Properties of Key Sets. From now on we will use the abstraction
of Key Sets to talk about pairs (TK ,VK) where
TK = (A(1),A(2), . . . ,A(N ))
VK =
(
дA(1),дA(2), . . . ,дA(N )
)
for some degree 6 f polynomial A ∈ Zq [x]. In the protocol, the
vectorVK is always publicly known (computed from a commitment
or several commitments) while TK is distributed among the nodes.
It can be though distributed dishonestly, in which case it might be
that several (possibly all) honest nodes are not familiar with their
corresponding tossing key. In particular, every Key Box denes a
key set and every MultiCoin denes a key set.
In the denition below we formalize what does it mean for a
key set to be "usable" for generating signatures (and thus really
generating randomness)
Definition E.1 (Usable Key Set). We say that a Key Set KS =
(TK ,VK) is usable with a set of key holders T ⊆ [N ] if:
(1) every honest node is familiar with VK and T ,
(2) |T | > 2f + 1,
(3) for every honest node Pi , if i ∈ T , then i holds tki .
The next lemma demonstrates that indeed a usable key set can be
used to generate signatures.
Lemma E.1. Suppose that (TK ,VK) is a usable key set, then if the
nodes being key holders include the shares for a noncem in the ch-DAG
at round r , then every honest node can recover the corresponding
signature σm at round r + 1.
Proof. Since the key set is usable, we know that there is exactly
one underlying polynomial A ∈ Zq [x] of degree f that was used to
generate (TK ,VK), hence every unit at round r created by a share
dealer i ∈ T can be veried using VerifyShare and hence it follows
that any set of f + 1 shares decodes the same value σm = mA(0)
using ExtractShares (see also [6]). It remains to observe that among
a set of (at least 2f + 1) round-r parents of a round-(r + 1) unit, at
least f + 1 are created by nodes in T and thus contain appropriate
shares. 
Generating Signatures using MultiCoins. We proceed to prov-
ing that the nodes can generate threshold signatures with respect
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to MultiCoins. The following structural lemma says, intuitively,
that at every round r there is a relatively large set of units that are
below every unit of round r + 3.
Lemma E.2 (Spread). Assume that an honest node Pi has just
created a unit U of round r + 3. At this moment, a set Sr of 2f + 1
units of round r is determined such that for every unit V of round
r + 3 and for any unitW ∈ Sr , we haveW 6 V .
Proof. Let K be a set of 2f + 1 nodes that created units in ↓(U ).
Let T be a set of 2f + 1 units of round r + 1 created by nodes in
K . Every unit in ↓(U ) is above 2f + 1 units of round r + 1, hence
it is above at least f + 1 units in T (the remaining f units may be
created by nodes outside of K). By the pigeonhole hole principle,
there exists a unit U0 ∈ T such that at least f + 1 units in ↓(U ) are
above it. Thus, every subset of 2f + 1 units of round r + 2 must
include at least one unit aboveU0, so every valid unit V of round
r + 3 will have at least one parent aboveU ′, thus V > U ′. Finally,
choose Sr :=↓(V ). 
We now proceed to proving a structural lemma that conrms several
claims that were made in Subsection 4.3 without proofs. We follow
the notation of Subsection 4.3.
Lemma E.3. Let Ti for i ∈ [N ] be the sets of indices of Key Sets
forming the ith MultiCoin, then
(1) For every i such that U [i; 6] exists, Ti has at least f + 1
elements.
(2) For every i ∈ [N ] and every j ∈ Ti , the Key Set KSj is usable.
(3) For every unit V of round r + 1 with r > 6, there exists a
set of f + 1 units in ↓(V ) such that they contain all shares
required to reconstruct all Key Sets that are below V .
Proof. Let D here be the local view of an honest node that has
created a unit of round at least 6. From Lemma E.2 we obtain sets
S0 and S3, which are in D because it includes at least one unit of
round 6.
For any i ∈ [N ] such thatU [i; 6] exists inD, the setTi is dened
as a function of the unitU [i; 6] and all units below it, therefore it
is consistent between honest nodes. Additionally, U [i; 6] is above
at least f + 1 units from S0 created by honest nodes (2f + 1 units
minus at most f created by malicious nodes), and creators of those
units must be included in Ti . Indeed, if a unit of round zero was
created by an honest node, then it is valid, and every round-3 unit
must vote 1 on it, as false-negative votes cannot be forged.
From now on, let T denote the union of all Ti s that are well
dened (i.e., exist) in D. Every unitW in the set S3 must vote 1
on every Key Box KBl for l ∈ T , becauseW is seen by every unit
of round 6. Since |S3 | > 2f + 1 and due to the denition of votes,
we see that every Key Set KSl for l ∈ T is usable by (possibly a
superset of) creators of S3.
If we take the intersection of the set of creators of S3, and the
set of ↓(V ) creators, then the resulting set contains at least f + 1
nodes. Units in ↓(V ) created by these f + 1 nodes must contain
valid shares from round r to all Key Sets created by nodes from T .
Indeed, this is required by the protocol, since these nodes declared
at round 3 that they will produce valid shares (recall that f +1 valid
shares are enough to read the secret).
Finally we remark that the node who holds D might not be
familiar with S3, but, nevertheless, it can nd at least f + 1 units
in ↓(V ) containing all required shares, because it knows T . 
In part (3) of the above lemma we show that we can always collect
shares from a single set of f + 1 units, which yields an optimization
from the viewpoint of computational complexity. The reason is
that each round of the setup requires generating O(N ) threshold
signatures, but if we can guarantee that each signature has shares
generated by the same set of f +1 nodes, then we may compute the
Lagrange coecients for interpolation only once (as they depend
only on node indices that are in the set) thus achieve computational
complexity O(N 3) instead of O(N 4) as in the basic solution.
Security of MultiCoins. The remaining piece is unpredictability
of multicoins, which is formalized below as
Lemma E.4. If a polynomially bounded adversary is able to forge a
signature generated using MultiCoini0 (for any i0 ∈ [N ]) for a fresh
noncem with probability ε > 0, then there exists a polynomial time
algorithm for solving the computational Die-Hellman problem over
the group G that succeeds with probability ε .
Proof. We start by formalizing our setting with regard to the
encryption scheme that is used to encrypt the tossing keys in key
boxes. Since it is semantically secure we can model encryption
as a black box. More specically we assume that for a key pair
(sk,pk), an adversary that does not know sk has to query a black
box encryption oracle Encpk (d) to create the encryption of a string
d for this public key. Further, we assume that whenever a string s is
fed into the decryption oracle Decsk (·) such that s was not obtained
by calling the encryption oracle by the adversary, then the output
Decsk (·) is a uniformly random string of length |s |. Since the key
pairs we use in the protocol are dedicated, the adversary has no
way of obtaining ciphertexts that were not created by him, for the
key sets he is forced to use.
Given this formalization we are ready to proceed with the proof.
We x any i0 ∈ [N ] and consider the MultiCoini0 . We use a sim-
ulation argument (see e.g. [43]) to show a reduction from forging
signatures to solving the Die-Hellman problem. To this end, let
(дα ,дβ ) be a random input to the Die-Hellman problem, i.e., the
goal is to compute дα β .
Suppose that an adversary can forge a signature of a random
element h ∈ G with probability ε > 0 when the honest nodes
behave honestly. We now dene a simulated run of the protocol
(to distinguish from anhonest run in which all honest node behave
honestly) which is indistinguishable from an honest run from the
perspective of the adversary, yet we can transform a successful
forgery into a solution of the given Die-Hellman triplet.
Description of the simulated run. For convenience assume that
the nodes controlled by the adversary have indices 1, 2, . . . , f . At
the very beginning, every honest node i ∈ { f + 1, f + 2, . . . ,N }
generates uniformly random values ri,0, ri,1, . . . , ri,f ∈ Zq and
denes a polynomialAi of degree at most f by specifying its values
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at f + 1 points as follows:
Ai (0) = α + ri,0,
Ai (1) = ri,1,
...
Ai (f ) = ri,f ,
where α ∈ Zq is the unknown value from the Die-Hellman in-
stance. Note that since α is unknown the ith node has no way to
recover the polynomial Ai (x) = ∑fj=0 ai, jx j but still, it can write
each of the coecients in the following form
ai, j = ai, j,0 + αai, j,1 for j = 0, 1, . . . , f ,
where ai, j,0,ai, j,1 ∈ Zq are known values. Since дα is known as
well, this allows the ith node to correctly compute the commitment
Ci =
(
дai,0 ,дai,1 , . . . ,дai, f
)
,
pretending that he actually knows Ai . Similarly he can forge a
key box KBi so that from the viewpoint of the adversary it looks
honest. This is the case because Pi knows the tossing keys for the
adversary tk1, tk2, . . . , tkf since these are simply ri,1, ri,2, . . . , ri,f .
Thus Pi can include in Ei the correct values ei,1, ei,2, . . . , ei,f and
simply ll the remaining slots with random strings of appropriate
length (since these are meant for the remaining honest nodes which
will not complain about wrong keys in the simulation).
In the simulation all the honest nodes are requested to vote
positively on key boxes created by honest nodes, even though the
encrypted tossing keys are clearly not correct. For the key boxes
dealt by the adversary the honest nodes act honestly, i.e., they
respect the protocol and validate as required. Suppose now that the
setup is over and that the honest nodes are requested to provide
shares for signing a particular nonce m. The value of the hash
h = hash(m) ∈ G is sampled in the simulation as follows: rst
sample a random element δm ∈ Zq and subsequently set
hash(m) = дδm .
Since in the simulation the value δm is revealed to the honest nodes,
the honest node Pj can compute its share corresponding to the ith
key set (for i > f + 1) as
hAi (j) =
(
дδm
)Ai (j)
=
(
дAi (j)
)δm
,
where the last expression can be computes since дAi (j) isvki, j (thus
computable from the commitment) and δm is known to j.
Solving Die-Hellman from a forged signature. After poly-
nomially many rounds of signing in which the hash function is
simulated to work as above, we let the hash function output дβ (the
element from the Die-Hellman input) for the nal noncem′ for
which the adversary attempts forgery. The goal of the adversary is
now to forge the signature, i.e., compute
(
дβ
)A(0)
, where
A(0) =
∑
i ∈Ti0
Ai (0),
is the cumulative secret key for the multicoin MultiCoini0 . For that,
the adversary does not see any shares provided by honest nodes.
Note that if we denote by H and D the set of indices of honest and
dishonest nodes (respectively) within Ti0 then the value of A(0) is
of the following form
A(0) =
∑
i ∈Ti0
Ai (0)
=
∑
i ∈H
Ai (0) +
∑
i ∈D
Ai (0)
= |H | · α +
∑
i ∈H
ri,0 +
∑
i ∈Di
Ai (0).
We observe that each value Ai (0) for i ∈ D can be recovered by
honest nodes, since at least f + 1 honest nodes must have validated
their keys when voting on KBi and thus honest nodes collectively
know at least f + 1 evaluations of Ai and thus can interpolate Ai (0)
as well. Similarly, the values ri,0 for i ∈ H are known by honest
nodes. Finally we observe that since by Lemma E.3 (a), |Ti | > f + 1,
it follows that |H | > 0. Thus consequently, we obtain that A(0) is
of the form
A(0) = γα + µ,
where γ , µ ∈ Zq are known to the honest nodes and γ , 0. Hence,
the signature forged by the adversary has the form(
дβ
)A(0)
= дγ α β+β µ =
(
дα β
)γ · (дβ )µ ,
and can be used to recover дα β since γ , µ and дβ are known.
The above reasoning shows that we can solve the Die-Hellman
problem given an adversary that can forge signatures; however
to formally conclude that, we still need to show that the view of
the adversary in such a simulated run is indistinguishable from an
honest run.
Indistinguishability of honest and simulated runs. We closely
investigate all the data that is emitted by honest nodes throughout
the protocol execution to see that these distributions are indistin-
guishable between honest and simulated runs. Below we list all
possible sources of data that adversary observes by listening to
honest nodes.
(1) The key boxes in an honest run and a simulated run look
the same to the adversary, as they are always generated
from uniformly random polynomials, and the evaluations
at points 1, 2, . . . , f are always honestly encrypted for
the nodes controlled by the adversary. The remaining
encrypted keys are indistinguishable from random strings
and thus the adversary cannot tell the dierence between
honest runs and simulated runs, since the values encrypted
by honest nodes are never decrypted.
(2) The votes (i.e., the VerKey(·, ·) values) of honest nodes on
honest nodes are always positive, hence the adversary does
not learn anything here.
(3) The shares generated by honest nodes throughout the
execution of the protocol are always correct, no matter
whether the run is honest or simulated (in which case the
honest nodes do not even know their keys).
(4) The votes of honest nodes on dishonest key boxes: this is
by far the trickiest to show and the whole reason why we
need dedicated key pairs for encryption in key boxes. We
argue that the adversary can with whole certainty predict
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the votes of honest nodes, hence this piece of data is in-
signicant: intuitivily the adversary cannot discover that
he "lives in simulation" by inspecting this data. Here is the
reason why the adversary learns nothing from these votes.
There are two cases:
(a) a dishonest node i ∈ [f ] includes as ei, j some cipher-
text that was generated using the encryption black
box Enci→j . That means that the adversary holds a
string d such that ei, j = Enci→j (d). In this case the
adversary can itself check whether d is the correct
tossing key. Thus the adversary can predict the vote
of Pj : either it accepts if d is the correct key, or it
rejects in which case it reveals Deci→j (ei, j ) = d .
(b) a dishonest node i ∈ [f ] includes as ei, j some string
that was never generated by the encryption black
box Enci→j . In this case, the decryption of ei, j is
simply a random string and thus agrees with the key
only with negligible probability. Thus the adversary
can tell with whole certainty that the vote on ei, j
will be negative and he only learns a random string
Deci→j (ei, j ).
All the remaining data generated by honest nodes throughout the
execution of the protocol is useless to the adversary as he could
simulate it locally. This concludes the proof of indistinguishability
between honest and simulated runs from the viewpoint of the
adversary. 
Proofs regarding SecretBits and ABFT-Beacon. We are now
ready to prove Lemma 4.2, i.e. show that the implementation of
SecretBits with MultiCoin during the ABFT−Beacon setup satises
the Denition 3.3 of SecretBits.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let Pk be any honest node. We start by
showing that during the run of the ABFT − Beacon setup if Pk
invokes SecretBits(i, r ), then r > 10 and the unit of round 6 created
by Pi is already present in the local copy Dk .
All SecretBits invocations happen insideChooseHead(6) or, more
precisely, in GeneratePermutation(6,D) and CommonVote(U , ·),
for units U of round 6. LetU be a set of units of round 6 present
in Dk at the time of any particular call to ChooseHead(6). Ad-
ditionally, let C be the set of all nodes that created units in U.
The procedure GeneratePermutation(6,D) calls SecretBits(i, 6+4)
for all i ∈ C, and function CommonVote(U ,V ) is deterministic if
R(V ) 6 R(U ) + 4 and hence calls only SecretBits(i,k), where i is
U ’s creator in C and k > 10.
Thus, from the above, the function SecretBits will be invoked
suciently late, hence all units of round 6 dening required Multi-
Coins will be already visible at that time. Lemma E.3 guarantees
that then the MultiCoin can be used to generate signatures since all
the keys sets comprising it are usable. The secrecy follows from the
fact that the signatures generated by MultiCoins are unpredictable
for the adversary (Lemma E.4). 
The above proof justies why is it easier to implement SecretBits
as a function of two arguments, instead of only using the round
number.
The next lemma shows that by combining key sets as in our
construction, we obtain a single key set that is secure, i.e., that
there are enough nodes holding tossing keys and that the generated
bits are secret.
Given the above lemma, we are ready to conclude the proof of
Theorem 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. From Lemma 4.2 we obtain that the
Setup phase of ABFT − Beacon executes correctly and a common
Key Set (TK ,VK) is chosen as its result. Moreover, by Lemma E.4
the output Key Set is secure and thus can be used to generate se-
crets. Consequently, Setup + Toss indeed implement a Randomness
Beacon according to Denition 2.2.
Communication Complexity. What remains, is to calculate the
communication complexity of the protocol. Observe that during
the setup, every unit might contain at most:
• O(N ) hashes of parent nodes,
• O(N ) verication keys,
• O(N ) encrypted tossing keys,
• O(N ) votes,
• O(N ) secret shares.
Since ChooseHead builds only an expected constant number of
DAG-rounds before terminating (see Lemma C.5), every node reli-
ably broadcasts O(1) units during the setup in expectation each of
which of size O(N ), thus the total communication complexity per
node is O(N 2 logN ).
Latency. Assume that honest nodes decide to instantiate Toss for
a given noncem during async-round ra . Then, each honest node
multicasts its respective share before async-round ra + 1 ends, thus
all such shares are bound to be delivered before the end of async-
round ra + 2. Thus, each honest node may reveal the value of a
Toss after at most 2 async-round, what concludes the proof. 
The last remaining piece is to prove Lemma 4.1 that claims correct-
ness of the main implementation of SecretBits.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The case with a trusted dealer follows for
instance from [6]. Consider now the harder case: when the Setup
of ABFT − Beacon is used to deal the keys. Then, the nodes end up
holding a Key Set that is secure by Lemma E.4 and can be used for
signing messages by Lemma E.1. 
F RELIABLE BROADCAST
In this section we describe ch-RBC – a modied version of Reliable
Broadcast (RBC) protocol introduced by [9] and improved by [17]
by utilizing erasure codes. The protocol is designed to transfer a
message from the sender (who instantiates the protocol) to the set
of receiving nodes in such a way that receivers can be certain that
they all received the same version of the message. More formally, a
protocol implements Reliable Broadcast if it meets the following
conditions:
(1) Termination. If an honest node instantiates RBC, all hon-
est nodes eventually terminate.
(2) Validity. If an honest node instantiates RBC with a mes-
sagem, then any honest node can only outputm.
(3) Agreement. If an honest node outputs a messagem, even-
tually all honest nodes outputm.
We implement four rather straightforward modications to the
original RBC protocol. First, before multicasting prevote message
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each node checks the size of the proposed unit (line 10) to prevent
the adversary from sending too big units and hence consuming too
much bandwidth of honest nodes24. Second, before multicasting
prevote, we wait until ch-DAG of a node reaches at least one round
lower then round of prevoted unit (line 11). This check counters
an attack in which adversary initializes ch-RBC for meaningless
pieces of data of rounds which do not exist in the ch-DAG yet, hence
wasting bandwidth of honest nodes. Third, after reconstructing
a unit U , we check if U is valid (line 16), i.e., we check if it has
enough parents, if one of its parents was created by U ’s creator,
and if the data eld of U contains all required components. Finally,
before multicasting commit message for unit U , nodes wait until
they receive all parents of U via RBC (line 17) to ensure that it will
be possible to attach U to ch-DAG25.
The following lemma summarizes the most important proper-
ties of ch-RBC protocol. Note that Latency is a strictly stronger
condition then Termination, and similarly Fast Agreement is
stronger then Agreement. Thus, in particular, this lemma proves
that ch-RBC implements Reliable Broadcast.
Lemma F.1. (reliable broadcast) For any given round r , all ch-RBC
runs instantiated for units of that round have the following properties:
(1) Latency. ch-RBC instantiated by an honest node terminates
within three async-rounds for all honest nodes.
(2) Validity If an honest node outputs a unitU in some instance
of ch-RBC,U had to be proposed in that instance.
(3) Fast Agreement. If an honest node outputs a unit U at
async-round ra , all honest nodes output U before async-
round ra + 2 ends,
(4) Message Complexity. In total, all the ch-RBC instances
have communication complexity26 at mostO(tr +N 2 logN )
per node, where tr is the total number of transactions input
in honest units of round r .
Proof. Latency. LetPi be an honest node instantiating ch-RBC
for unit Ui during the async-round r so that the propose messages
are sent during r as well. Each honest node during the atomic
step in which it receives the propose message multicasts the corre-
sponding prevote. Since proposals were sent during async-round
r , async-round r + 1 cannot end until all of them are delivered, all
honest nodes multicast prevotes during async-round r + 1. Simi-
larly, all prevotes sent by honest nodes need to reach their honest
recipients during async-round r + 2, hence honest nodes multicast
their commits during async-round r + 227. Finally, the commits of
all honest nodes reach their destination before the end of async-
round r + 3 causing all honest nodes to locally terminate at that
time, what concludes the proof.
24Since in this version of RBC nodes learn about the content of broadcast message only
after multicasting it as prevote, without this modication adversary could propose
arbitrarily big chunks of meaningless data and hence inate message complexity
arbitrarily high.
25Note that this condition is not possible to check before multicasting prevote since
nodes are not able to recover U at that stage of the protocol.
26We remark that N 2 log(N ) can be improved to N 2 in the communication complexity
bound by employing RSA accumulators instead of Merkle Trees in the RBC protocol.
27A cautious reader probably wonders about the wait in line 16. It will not cause
an execution of ch-RBC instantiated by an honest node to halt since before sending
proposals during async-round ra a node must have had all U ’s parents output locally
by other instances of ch-RBC, hence each other node will have them output locally by
the end of async-round ra + 2, by condition Fast Agreement
ch-RBC:
/* (Protocol for node Pi with sender Ps
broadcasting unit U of round r) */
1 if Pi = Ps then
2 {sj }j ∈N←shares of (f+1,N )-erasure coding of U
3 h ←Merkle tree root of {sj }j ∈N
4 for j ∈ N do
5 bi ←Merkle branch of sj
6 send propose(h,bj , sj ) to Pj
7 upon receiving propose(h,bj , sj ) from Ps do
8 if received_propose(Pi , r ) then
9 terminate
10 if check_size(sj ) then
11 wait until Di reaches round r − 1
12 multicast prevote(h,bj , sj )
13 received_propose(Pi , r ) = True
14 upon receiving 2f + 1 valid prevote(h, ·, ·) do
15 reconstructU from sj
16 if U is not valid then terminate
17 wait until all U ’s parents are locally output by Pi
18 interpolate all {s ′j }j ∈N from f + 1 shares
19 h′ ←Merkle tree root of {s ′j }j ∈N
20 if h=h′ and commit(Ps , r , ·) has not been send then
21 multicast commit(Ps , r ,h)
22 upon receiving f + 1 commit(Ps , r ,h) do
23 if commit(Ps , r , ·) has not been send then
24 multicast commit(Ps , r ,h)
25 upon receiving 2f + 1 commit(Ps , r ,h) do
26 outputU decoded from sj ’s
27 check_size(sj):
28 T ← number of transactions in U inferred from sj -th size
/* CB is a global parameter of the protocol */
29 if T > CB ·(i-th batch size in round r ) then
30 output False
31 else output True
Validity. The rst honest node to produce the commit message
for a given unit U has to do it after receiving 2f + 1 precommit
messages forU , out of which at least f + 1 had to be multicast by
other honest nodes. Since honest nodes are sending prevotes only
for shares they received as proposals,U had to be proposed by node
initiating ch-RBC.
Fast Agreement. Assume that an honest node Pi has output a
unit U at async-round ra during some instance of ch-RBC. Since
it can happen only after receiving 2f + 1 commit messages for U ,
at least f + 1 honest nodes had to multicast commit for U . Each
honest node engages in ch-RBC for only one version of each node’s
unit for a given DAG-round, so it is not possible for any other node
to output a unit dierent thanU for that instance of ch-RBC.
On the other hand, Pi must have received at least f + 1 commit
messages forU , which have been multicast before async-round ra
ended. By denition of async-round, all of these commits must have
reached their honest recipients before async-round ra + 1 ended.
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Consequently, after gathering f + 1 commits for U , all honest
multicasted their commits before async-round ra + 1 ended. Thus,
each honest node received commits from every other honest node
before the end of async-round ra + 2, and terminated outputtingU .
Message Complexity. Each honest node engages in at most N
ch-RBC instances for each DAG-round r , since it accepts only one
proposal from each node. Let now Pi be an honest node with buer
of size Br . Due to the condition in line 10, Pi engages only in ch-
RBC instances broadcasting units of size at most CB BrN , where CB
is the constant from the uniform buer distribution assumption.
A single instance of ch-RBC proposing a unit U has commu-
nication complexity of O(size(U ) + N logN ), see [17] (here the
communication complexity is computed per honest node). Now,
because of the uniorm buer distribution property we know that
every valid unit of round r includes between C−1B
Br
N and CB
Br
N
transactions (with CB = Θ(1)) thus if U is such a unit, we have
size(U ) = O
(
Br
N
+ N
)
,
where the +N comes from the fact that such a unit contains O(N )
parent hashes. Consequently the total communication complexity
in round r is upper bounded by
N∑
i=1
(
size(U [i; r ]) + N logN ) = N ·O (Br
N
+ N + N logN
)
= O(Br + N 2 logN )
= O(tr + N 2 logN ).
Where the last equality follows because the total number of trans-
actions in honest units is tr = 2N/3 · Θ (Br/N ) = Θ (Br ).

General RBC with proofs of termination. Note that the above
scheme diers from classical RBC only in four mentioned ch-DAG-
related aspects, hence after deleting additional checks it can be
used to broadcast arbitrary pieces of data. Additionally, one simple
modication can be done, which provides a proof that RBC has
terminated for each node which had received the output locally.
Namely, together with commit message, each node can send share
of a threshold signature of hash h with threshold 2f + 1. Then,
each node that gathered 2f + 1 is able to construct the threshold
signature and use it as a proof of the fact that RBC had nalized at
its end.
G ASYNCHRONOUS MODEL
Slightly informally, the dierence between synchronous an asyn-
chronous network is typically explained as the absence of a global
bound ∆ on all message delays in asynchronous setting. In this
paper, we use the following formalization adopted from Canetti and
Rabin [19], where the adversary has a full control over the network
delays, but is committed to eventually deliver each message to its
recipient.
Definition G.1 (Asynchronous Network Model). The exe-
cution of the protocol proceeds in consecutive atomic steps. In each
U [3; r + 2; 1–2] U [4; r + 2; 1–2]
U [1; r + 1; 1–4] U [2; r + 1; 1–4]
U [5; r + 3; 1] U [6; r + 3; 1]
H
Figure 1: A "Fork Bomb" for K = 3. Only the top unit
(marked H ) is created by an honest node. Every collection
of units within a dashed oval depicts forks produced by a
certain dishonest node.
atomic step the adversary chooses a single node Pi which is then
allowed to perform the following actions:
• read a subset S , chosen by the adversary, among all its pend-
ing messages. Messages in S are considered delivered,
• perform a polynomially bounded computation,
• send messages to other nodes; they stay pending until deliv-
ered.
Thus, in every atomic step one of the nodes may read messages,
perform computations, and send messages. While such a model may
look surprisingly single-threaded, note that an order in which nodes
act is chosen by an adversary, hence intuitively corresponds to the
worst possible arrangements of network delays. The following
denition by [19] serves as a main measure of time for the purpose
of estimating latency of our protocols.
Definition G.2 (Asynchronous Round). Let l0 be an atomic
step in which the last node is chosen by adversary to perform an
action, i.e., after l0 each node acted at least once. The asynchronous
rounds of the protocol and the subsequent ls are dened as follows:
• All atomic steps performed after li−1 until (and including) li
have asynchronous round i ,
• li is the atomic step in which the last message sent during
asynchronous round li−1 is delivered.
H FORK BOMB ATTACK
In this section we describe a resource-exhaustion attack scenario
on DAG-based protocols. Generally speaking, this attack applies to
protocols that allows adding nodes (which in our case are called
units – we stick to this name for the purpose of explaining the
attack) to the DAG performing only “local validation". By this we
mean that upon receiving a unit, the node checks only that its
parents are correct and that the unit satises some protocol-specic
rules that are checked based only on the data included in this unit
and on its parents (possibly recursively), and adds this unit to the
DAG if the checks are successful. In particular, such a protocol
has to allow adding forked units to the DAG, as it can happen that
two distinct honest nodes built upon two distinct variants of a fork,
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hence there is no way to roll it back. At this point we also remark
that a mechanism of banning nodes that are proved to be forking
(or malicious in some other way) is not sucient to prevent this
attack.
We note that while the ickAleph protocol (without the alert
system) satises the above condition, the Aleph protocol and the
ickAleph extended with the alert system, do not. This is because
Aleph uses reliable broadcast to disseminate units (which gives a
non-local validation mechanism) and similarly the alert system for
ickAleph adds new non-local checks before adding units created
by forkers. On the other hand, protocols such as Hashgraph [4] or
Blockmania [23] satisfy this condition and thus are aected, if not
equipped with an appropriate defense mechanism.
The main idea of the attack is for a group of malicious nodes
to create an exponentially large number of forking units, which
all must be accepted by honest nodes if the protocol relies only on
locally validating units. The goal is to create so many valid forked
units that honest nodes which end up downloading them (and they
are forced to do so since these units are all valid) are likely to crash
or at least slow down signicantly because of exhausting RAM or
disc memory. Even though this leads to revealing the attacking
nodes, there might be no way to punish them, if most of the nodes
are unable to proceed with the protocol.
Description of the attack. We describe the attack using the lan-
guage and rules specic to the ickAleph protocol (without the
alert system). For simplicity, when describing parents of units we
only look at their dishonest parents and assume that apart from
that, they also connect to all honest units of an appropriate round.
At the end of this section we also give some remarks on how one
can adjust this description to any other DAG-based protocol.
Technically, the attack is performed as follows: forK consecutive
rounds all malicious nodes create forking units, but abstain from
sending them to any honest node, after thesee K rounds, they start
broadcasting forks from this huge set. Assume that the malicious
nodes participating in the attack are numbered 1, 2, . . . , 2K − 1, 2K .
Recall that U [j; r ] denotes the round-r unit created by node j. We
extend this notation to include forks – letU [j; r ; i] denote the i-th
fork, hence U [j; r ] = U [j; r ; 1].
Suppose it is round r when the attack starts, it will then nish in
round r +K . We refer to Figure 1 for an example of this construction
for K = 3. A formal description follows: x a k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
the goal of nodes 2k − 1 and 2k is to fork at round r + k , more
specically:
(1) For the initial k − 1 rounds (starting from round r ) these
nodes create regular, non-forking units.
(2) At round r +k the nodes create 2K−k forks each, which are
sent only to other malicious nodes if k < K , and broadcast
to every other node if k = K . Note that nodes 2K − 1 and
2K in fact do not fork, hence their units must be eventually
accepted by honest nodes.
(3) UnitsU [1; r + 1; i] andU [2; r + 1; i] can have any round-r
units as parents, for i = 1, . . . , 2G−1.
(4) For k > 1 unitU [2k−1; r+k ; i] hasU [2k−3; r+k−1; 2i−1]
andU [2k−2; r+k−1; 2i−1] as parents, for i = 1, . . . , 2K−k .
(5) For k > 1 unitU [2k ; r +k ; i] hasU [2k − 3; r +k − 1; 2i] and
U [2k − 2; r + k − 1; 2i] as parents, for i = 1, . . . , 2K−k .
Validity of all the forks is easily checked by induction: all units
U [1; r + 1; i] and U [2; r + 1; i] are valid, because there are no forks
below them (although they are invalid in the sense that they are
forked, this fact always becomes apparent only after some other
valid nodes has built upon them). Now assume that unitsU [2k −
3; r +k − 1; 2i − 1] andU [2k − 2; r +k − 1; 2i − 1] are valid. Then the
unitU [2k − 1; r +k ; i] is valid, because there are no forks created by
nodes 2k − 3 or 2k − 2 below it. Analogously, the unitU [2k ; r +k ; i]
is valid.
Since the nodes 2K − 1 and 2K cannot be banned, then units
U [2K − 1; r +K ; 1] andU [2K ; r +K ; 1] with their lower cones must
be accepted by all honest nodes, and both of them contain at least
2K+1 − 2 units in total, counting only K most recent rounds.
To conclude let us give a couple of remarks regarding this attack:
(1) The attack is rather practical, as it does not require any
strong assumptions about the adversary (e.g. no control
over message delays is required). It is enough for the ad-
versary to coordinate its pool of malicious nodes.
(2) The attack allows any number of parents for a unit. If
the protocol requires exactly two parents per unit, with
the previous unit created by the same node (as in Hash-
graph) then one round of the attack can be realized in two
consecutive rounds.
(3) If a larger number of parents is required, then the adversary
can connect in addition to any subset of honest units. This
is possible because honest nodes can always advance the
protocol without the help of malicious nodes, and the num-
ber of required parents cannot be higher than the number
of honest nodes.
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